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Domesticating Federal Indian Law
Philip P. Frickey*
"As every schoolchild learns," the Supreme Court has said,
"our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government."' What schoolchildren-and almost all law students-do not learn is that
this story of sovereignty is radically incomplete. "Our Federalism"2 came about through our colonialism. Accordingly, although sovereignty created by the United States Constitution
is indeed dual, sovereignty within the United States is triadic:
American Indian tribes have sovereignty as well. Precisely a
century ago, the Supreme Court itself squarely recognized that
tribal sovereignty is not "created by and springing from the
Constitution,"3 but rather is an inherent sovereignty that
"existed prior to the Constitution"4 and is, therefore, not subject to it.5 Tribes today continue to exercise sovereignty in a

* Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, S. James Anaya, Jim Chen, Carol Chomsky, Daniel Farber,
Daniel Gifford, Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Stephen Legomsky, Fred Morrison,
Hiroshi Motomura, Gerald Neuman, Nell Jessup Newton, Todd Rakoff, Joseph William Singer, Gerald Torres, David Weissbrodt, and participants at
faculty workshops at Harvard Law School and the University of Minnesota
Law School provided helpful comments on a draft of this article. Laura Walvoord provided valuable research assistance.
Casebooks are rarely cited as scholarly sources, but for this project, which
I began with little knowledge of either immigration law or international human rights, I found very educational the excellent books of THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY (3d ed.
1995); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY (1992); and
FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW,
POLICY, AND PROCESS (2d ed. 1996).

1. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
2. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
3. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896).

4. Id. at 384.
5. See id. at 385. In 1968, Congress by statute applied many Bill of
Rights limitations to tribal action. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03
(1994)).
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variety of important ways, including having a local police
power over their members 6 as well as the authority to regulate
nonmembers in some circumstances.7
What the Supreme Court has assumed that schoolchildren
learn reveals more than merely an incomplete picture of sovereignty, however. Just a generation ago, and only one year after Brown v. Board of Education,8 the Warren Court concluded
that the federal government could unilaterally take the aboriginal lands of Indians without constitutional consequence,

including any requirement of just compensation. 9 Writing for
the majority, Justice Reed stated that "[e]very schoolboy knows
that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their
ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians
ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food
and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land."' ° Every learned schoolchild would
be appalled by this point, for it cannot be defended as accurate,
if incomplete. Instead, it is just plain wrong, a mixture of myth
and ethnocentrism masquerading as past legal practice."
6. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) ("It is
undisputed that Indian tribes have power to enforce their criminal laws
against tribe members.").
7. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990) (explaining that
tribes possess a "traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons whom
they deem to be undesirable from tribal lands"); Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 438-44 (1989)
(holding that a tribe may zone non-Indian land on a closed portion of a reservation); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982) (holding
that a tribe may tax nonmembers who conduct business on a reservation);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (explaining that a tribe
may "retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of nonIndians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe") (dictum).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1955).
No Justice dissented from this conclusion about the unprotected status of
aboriginal lands. Rather, the dissenting opinion argued that Congress by
statute had recognized the Indians' title to the land and thereby rendered it
property protected by the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 294 (Douglas, J.,
joined by Warren, C.J. & Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 289-90.
11. One of the oddest things about Justice Reed's dictum is that Tee-HitTon involved the taking of aboriginal property interests in Alaska, where no
Seventh Cavalry ever waged war upon Natives. What federal governmental
institution "conquered" the Tee-Hit-Ton, and when did it happen? Nell Jessup
Newton persuasively argues that the institution had to be the Supreme Court
and the year had to be 1955, the date of the decision. See Nell Jessup New-
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The problem for schoolchildren as well as the rest of us is
that the assumptions we make as proud Americans about our
country and its Constitution run headlong into an alternative
reality when our vision is expanded to include the historical
facts and the ongoing nature of the colonization of this continent. The involuntary displacement of indigenous peoples
from their lands and their political subjugation by a selfproclaimed superior sovereignty is ironic, indeed, in a country
that began by declaring itself independent of colonial status
and that soon adopted a Constitution that has served as a
model for restraining the abuse of public power. In both law
and life, things are a good deal more complicated-both descriptively and normatively-than grade school history classes,
high school civics classes, and law school constitutional law
classes suggest.
The complexity has not been lost on the Supreme Court.
2 it stated that
Over a century ago, in United States v. Kagama,"
"[t]he relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of
the United States, both before and since the Revolution, to the
people of the United States has always been an anomalous one
and of a complex character."" As an observation on American
law, this conclusion was, and remains, a colossal understatement. That federal Indian law is a snarl of doctrinal complicaton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HAST.
L.J. 1215, 1241-44 (1980).

Justice Reed's choice of words suggests a direct slap at the preeminent
scholar of federal Indian law, Felix Cohen, who had earlier challenged what
"[elvery American schoolboy is taught to believe" about the transfer of Indian
lands to the European colonists and their successors. See Felix S. Cohen,
OriginalIndian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34 (1947). See generally Newton,
supra, at 1215 (noting the parallelism between the Cohen and Reed phrases).
Cohen argued that in almost every instance tribes had relinquished the land
by transaction rather than by conquest. See Cohen, supra,at 35. To be sure,
he acknowledged that the government paid inadequate consideration in many
instances. See id. at 42. Cohen hoped, however, that these inadequacies
would be remedied through the recently adopted Indian Claims Commission
process. See id. at 42-43.
In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court apparently engaged in what can only be called
judicial fiscal restraint. Had it concluded that aboriginal property interests
were "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes, and that just compensation
must be paid for taking such property, the federal government would have
been exposed to very substantial liability in the Indian claims process. The
Court as much as acknowledged that this concern influenced its conclusions.
See Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 283 n.17 (noting that approximately nine billion
dollars in claims and interest had accrued against the government).
12. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
13. Id. at 381.
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tions is probably the single thing most commonly known about
it.' 4 Most likely, it is also the only thing about it known by any
sizable portion of the American legal community.
In Kagama, the Court translated the anomaly, if not the
complexity, into law. It upheld the authority of Congress to
enact legislation15 criminalizing conduct between members of
an Indian tribe while on its reservation. The Court candidly
acknowledged that this conclusion did not easily coincide with
ordinary constitutional interpretation. It began by noting that
the Constitution "is almost silent in regard to the relations of
the government which was established by it to the numerous
tribes of Indians within its borders."1 6 The Court then forthrightly rejected the only theory put before it that might
straightforwardly reconcile the statute with Article I-that the
law was somehow within congressional authority under the
Indian Commerce Clause-because the law lacked any substantial nexus with commerce.' 7 Nonetheless, the Court justified this intrusion of supervening federal authority into a
wholly intratribal matter on two grounds--one primarily descriptive, the other normative-spun together in a whirlwind of
circular reasoning. Descriptively, the Indians were within the
boundaries of the United States, owed allegiance to no foreign
power, and, the Court assumed, were incapable of providing for
themselves. 8 Normatively, "[f]rom their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it
14. The Justices themselves have admitted their frustration with the
complexities and seeming insignificance of federal Indian law. See Philip P.
Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,and
Interpretationin FederalIndian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (1993).

Commentators have bemoaned the confusions and inconsistencies of this law
as well. See id. at 418 n.158.

15. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (1883-1885).
16. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378. In this conclusion, at least, the Court was
on safe ground. The Constitution mentions Indians only three times-once to
authorize Congress to regulate "commerce ... with the Indian tribes," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and twice more to exclude "Indians not taxed" from
the population base for the apportionment of the House of Representatives.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
17. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79. This conclusion remains valid today as
well. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626-36 (1995) (invalidating
a federal statute outlawing intrastate noncommercial activity as beyond Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce); infra notes 73 and 164
(discussing Lopez).
18. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379-80.
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the power."19
Kagama was the first case in which the Supreme Court essentially embraced the doctrine that Congress has plenary
power over Indian affairs. 0 Its apparent inconsistency with
the most fundamental of constitutional principles-the McCulloch2 understanding that Congress ordinarily possesses only
that authority delegated to it in the Constitution-is an embarrassment of constitutional theory. Its slipshod method of
bootstrapping a congressional plenary power over Indian affairs is an embarrassment of logic. Its holding, which intimates that congressional power over Indian affairs is limitless,
is an embarrassment of humanity.
Almost two decades later, in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,22 the
Court avoided the illogic of Kagama while nonetheless further
entrenching congressional plenary power. In Lone Wolf, the
Court concluded that exercises of congressional authority over
Indian affairs were nonjusticiable political questions. 23 The
Court subjected domestic Indian treaties to the same status
under domestic law as international treaties: both may be
unilaterally abrogated by Congress without fear of domestic legal consequences. 24 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
conjoined the plenary power over Indian affairs with a similarly expansive authority
over immigration recognized in the
25
Chinese Exclusion Case.
In a legal system that prides itself as based on a Constitution that delegates only specified powers to its national legislature and then cabins the exercise of that authority by a Bill of
Rights, it may seem remarkable that Congress could have ever
19. Id. at 384 (emphasis added). The only alternative considered, leaving
governance of Indians to states, was rejected because "[t]hey owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies." Id.
20. For overviews of the development of the plenary power doctrine, see
Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and

Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 207-28 (1984); Laurence M. Hauptman,
Congress, Plenary Power, and the American Indian, 1870-1992, in EXILED IN
THE LAND OF THE FREE 317 (Oren Lyons et al. eds., 1992).
21. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
23. Id. at 566.

24. Id.; see also The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 620-22 (1870)
(treating Indian treaties and federal statutes as equivalent sources of law,
such that a treaty may be abrogated by a subsequent statute).
25. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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been accorded a "plenary power" in these two fields.2" Even
more remarkably, plenary power remains, at least in form, the
law of both." A less palatable contemporary constitutional
doctrine would be hard to identify, for it denies the immigrant
the dignity of fair treatment and the Native the dignity of selfdetermination and cultural survival.
In this Article, I will critically examine the constitutional
problems arising from the plenary power in federal Indian law.
This assessment will require, first, a more complete review of
the late-nineteenth-century origins of plenary power in the
field. This review, in turn, necessitates revisiting the parallel
development of plenary power in the allied field of immigration
law. As I will explain, although the plenary power doctrines in
both fields are similar, reform cannot take the same path for
each of them. To be sure, the doctrines in both should be domesticated, in two senses of that term: each doctrine needs to
be civilized by domestic law clearly enforceable in American
courts. Nonetheless, the theory by which domestic law can perform this reform must be quite different in the two fields. Indeed, I will suggest that one potentially appropriate tack taken
to ameliorate the anomalous and harsh aspects of immigration
law would be disastrous for federal Indian law.
Paradoxically, I shall argue that the domestication of federal Indian law may require internationalizing the way we
think about the field-and the way we think about how the
Constitution works in this unique area of the law. For I shall
26. Throughout this Article, I will follow conventional usage by defining
the field of "immigration law" to mean "that body of law that governs the admission and expulsion of aliens." Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of
Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HAST. CON. L.Q.
925, 925 n.2 (1995); see also Hiroshi Motomura, The CuriousEvolution of Immigration Law: ProceduralSurrogatesfor Substantive ConstitutionalRights,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1626 (1992) (using same definition). My argument is
that this subset of the law concerning aliens is similar to federal Indian law in
important ways. "The more general law of aliens' rights and obligations lends
itself to fewer generalizations," Legomsky, supra, at 925, and is less similar to
federal Indian law.
27. On federal Indian law, see Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) ("[The central function of the Indian Commerce
Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of
Indian affairs."); on immigration law, see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977) (describing Congress's "broad power over immigration and naturalization"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972) (emphasizing the
numerous reaffirmations of Congress's plenary power over immigration). But
cf. infra text accompanying notes 52-76 (discussing implications of recent decisions on the plenary power over Indian affairs).
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contend that, properly understood, plenary power in federal
Indian law, like that in immigration law, arose from conceptions of the inherent sovereignty of nations under international
law. All nations have inherent authority to control the influx
of foreigners. Only those nations created by colonization, however, face the question of inherent power over "foreigners" already present-indigenous peoples. Because international law
sanctioned colonization, it also must have had within it a notion that the colonial government that results has inherent
authority to engage in relations with indigenous peoples. All
this proves, however, is that the United States government
should have authority over Indian affairs. In this sense, congressional "plenary" power at most simply means "complete
and exclusive"-both internationally vis-h-vis other nations
and domestically vis-h-vis the states of the union-but not
"absolute" in either sphere. In short, the power over Indian affairs, like all other congressional powers, should be subject to
limitation through the judicial process.
Moreover, if international law notions of inherent sover,
eignty provide the only justification for even this more limited
conception of congressional power, it follows that the Constitution is inextricably linked to international law on issues of Indian affairs. Thus, the interpretation not only of the existence
and nature of congressional power, but of its constitutional
limits as well, should be informed by international law, including the evolving component of it concerning the rights of indigenous peoples. On this understanding, the emerging international law concerning the rights of indigenous peoples
becomes more than simply a set of externally derived norms
that do not bind the United States without its formal consent.
Instead, these norms have true linkage to our Constitution and
provide a domestic interpretive backdrop for both constitutional interpretation and quasi-constitutional interpretive
techniques, such as canons for construing federal Indian treaties and statutes. Through several examples, I hope to demonstrate that internationalizing our understanding of federal Indian law would revive a Constitution now moribund in the field
and would provide further legitimacy to interpretive techniques that have long been at the heart of federal Indian law,
but that today have less force in the Supreme Court.
I write against the backdrop of my earlier work in this
field, which has attempted to demonstrate several basic facets
of federal Indian law. First, I have contended that federal In-
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dian law is doctrinally chaotic, awash in a sea of conflicting,
albeit often unarticulated, values, and that reconstruction of
the field should be accomplished in a pragmatic, contextually
sensitive way.2" Second, I have argued that this reconstruction
should not be ad hoc, but instead should be structured around
the basic strategies embraced by Chief Justice Marshall in his
foundational opinions in the field. 29 I have argued that Marshall attempted to mediate the extraordinary tensions between
colonialism and constitutionalism through interpretive techniques that conceptualized Indian treaties and other articles of
positive law as constitutive documents-that is, text constituting the institutions and relationships of an ongoing sovereignto-sovereign relationship, much like the United States Constitution operates to arrange governmental powers and their limits within our federal system.3 ° Marshall's mediating approach
essentially considered the historical realities of colonization to
be beyond judicial reconsideration, but it addressed new questions of the unilateral displacement of indigenous peoples by
approaching these constitutive documents through a complex
interpretive calculus, represented by the canons of interpretation in federal Indian law, that attempted to preserve indige31
nous rights against all but clear congressional deprivations.
This interpretive strategy put the complete burden of colonization upon the centralized legislature-the Congress. Thus, the
states were excluded from the process of colonialism, and Congress bore the responsibility of identifying Indian rights,
weighing whether they should be abrogated,
and drafting clear
32
text to effect any loss of those rights.
The present Article addresses two primary gaps in this
work. The first is that the interpretive approach of Chief Justice Marshall has lost much of its force in the current Supreme
Court.3 3 This Article attempts to provide strong justifications
in contemporary law as well as contemporary norms for revital28. See Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning, and
the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian-Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 11421209, 1216-22 (1990).
29. See id. at 1222-30; Frickey, supra note 14, at 406-17.
30. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 427-29; cf. RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH &
JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL

LIBERTY 270-82 (1980) (arguing for a relationship of "treaty federalism" between tribes and the United States).
31. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 412-17.
32. See id. at 417.
33. See id. at 422-26, 432-37.
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izing that methodology. Second, and even more fundamentally,
the method that I have ascribed to Marshall assumes that
Congress does have something approximating a plenary power
over Indian affairs, so long as Congress exercises that power
through clear positive law. That remains my understanding of
his approach, but must we be satisfied with this absence of judicial review today? After all, we live five centuries after the
colonial process began and one and one-half centuries after
Marshall considered these questions, in a time in which colonialism has fallen into complete disrepute and in which the institution of judicial review is a good deal less fragile than in
Marshall's time. Just as, in my view, Marshall struggled
within his own situatedness to mediate constitutionalism and
colonialism,3 4 we, too, can renew that struggle in today's quite
different context. I argue that we can break new conceptual
and doctrinal ground while remaining steadfast to Marshall's
basic human instinct to mediate our constitutional and colonial
traditions rather than simply deferring to the latter. In short,
we can do better today, and doing so is perfectly consistent
with Marshall's approach to these conundrums.
The timing of this proposal is propitious. This year, for the
first time in history, the Supreme Court struck down a federal
statute involving Indian affairs on structural constitutional
principles.3 5 Although it may be an exaggeration to say that
federal Indian law has come, at last, to a constitutional crossroads, the time is ripe for considering an exit from the well
worn but warped path of plenary power.
I. PLENARY POWER TODAY: THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT
The way to begin this assessment is to return to the era in
which plenary power developed in both federal Indian law and
immigration law. When read together, the Chinese Exclusion
Case3 6 and Lone Wolf 37 demonstrate the essentially unlimited
power of Congress over immigration and Indian affairs at the
turn of this century.
The first of these, the Chinese Exclusion Case, involved an
1880 treaty with China that suspended immigration from

34. See id. at 393-98.
35. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); infra text accompanying notes 52-76 (discussing Seminole Tribe).
36. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
37. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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China but preserved the right of Chinese citizens already here
"to go and come of their own free will and accord." 38 The federal government gave Chinese citizens who temporarily returned to their homeland federal certificates that entitled them
to reenter the United States. In 1888, Congress enacted 3a9
statute unilaterally abolishing the right of free exit and entry,
effectively stranding people who were temporarily in China,
even though they possessed the reentry certificates. The Court
concluded that congressional abrogation of an international
treaty created nonjusticiable political questions that were
"conclusive upon the judiciary."0 Any relief would have to
come from international, rather than domestic, law. This conclusion essentially relegated the victims to asking the Chinese
government to negotiate with the American political branches
for redress or to take retaliatory measures allowed under international law.
Lone Wolf involved a treaty between the federal government and an Indian tribe providing that no further cession of
tribal land to the federal government could occur without the
agreement of three-fourths of the adult male members of the
tribe. Tribal members alleged that federal agents had fraudulently obtained the requisite signatures to a land-cession
agreement. In any event, Congress ultimately enacted a statute compelling cession of tribal land that differed from the
agreement in various respects. The Supreme Court in Lone
Wolf refused to invalidate this breach of the treaty. It stated
that "[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and
the power has always been deemed a political one." 41 To be
sure, the Court stated that "a moral obligation rested upon
Congress to act in good faith in performing the [treaty] stipulations entered into on its behalf."4 2 Nonetheless, the Court
cited the Chinese Exclusion Case and concluded that, "as with
treaties made with foreign nations, . . . the legislative power
might43 pass laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians."
Since that time, immigration law and federal Indian law
38. Treaty of Nov. 17, 1880, U.S.-China, 22 Stat. 826, 827 (1881-1883).
39. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504 (1887-1889).
40.

Chinese Exclusion, 130 U.S. at 606.

41. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
42. Id. at 566.

43. Id. (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889)).
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have stood together well outside the "constitutional law mainstream."' Although there may be many reasons for this extraordinary deference in both fields, probably the major one is
sovereignty. 5 Foreign citizens and members of Indian tribes
are full-fledged members of the polity of a sovereign other than
the United States, which in turn has a sovereign-to-sovereign
relationship with the United States. Federal regulation based
on alienage or Indian status is therefore conceived of as a political classification, rather than one 4defined by race or other
"discrete and insular minority" status. "
Although the implications of sovereignty distort both immigration law and federal Indian law, the latter seems the
more anomalous. Unlike in immigration law, Congress exer-

44. See Motomura, supra note 26, at 1691 & n.337.
45. Several other arguments for special judicial deference to immigration
measures have little potential application in the context of federal power over
Indian affairs. Legomsky notes that courts have sometimes considered aliens
as having simply the revocable license of a guest. Legomsky, supra note 26, at
927-28. He further states that aliens might be considered as having manifested insufficient allegiance to the United States to become full beneficiaries
of constitutional protections. Id. at 928. Neither of these notions applies to
Native Americans, who by definition are American citizens today. See infra
note 47 and accompanying text (discussing Indians' status as citizens). Legomsky also notes that courts have sometimes said that aliens should not
have the "unfair advantage" of full constitutional rights when, under international law, they retain certain rights based on foreign citizenship. Legmosky,
supra note 26, at 927-28. Again, this has little salience in the context of
American Indians, for tribes lack full sovereignty under international law.
See infra text accompanying notes 48-50 (describing Indians' lack of full international sovereignty).
46. The reference is, of course, to the theory associated with United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), under which
discrete and insular minorities should receive special protection against
prejudiced governmental decisions, and the elaboration of this theory found in
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). The theory explains the
Supreme Court's application of rigid constitutional scrutiny to most state governmental classifications that disadvantage aliens. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 373-83 (1971) (striking down denial of welfare benefits
to noncitizens lawfully resident in the state). By analogy, the same approach
should apply to state governmental discrimination against Native Americans.
See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 646-49, 653-54,
658-60 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LW]. The premise of both lines of cases is that states ordinarily do
not have any rational and legitimate sovereign purpose in treating aliens or
Native Americans as different from other residents. In other words, the political (sovereign) aspects of alienage and membership in an Indian tribe are
federal, not state, concerns. For federal Indian law, that principle is as old as
Worcester v. Georgia,31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See infra text accompanying
notes 97-106 (discussing the Worcester rationale).
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cises its plenary power in federal Indian law over persons who
today are uniformly resident citizens.4 7 Moreover, even at the
turn of the century, Indians who were not United States citizens were essentially nationals of this country who lacked citizenship in any international sovereign.48 Thus, unlike the Chinese citizens victimized in the Chinese Exclusion Case, the
non-American sovereignty to which Indians owe allegiancetheir tribe-is a "domestic dependent nation" involuntarily
wedded into a ward-gnardian" relationship with the United
States rather than a Mi-fledged international sovereignty.49
The tribe has no capacity to use the retaliatory tools of international law-trade embargoes, cessation of relations, war-to
seek to change congressional policies, nor has it access to any
international forum to seek redress." Moreover, unlike an
alien, an American Indian who is fed up with'the treatment accorded in the United States cannot leave and return to her native land and culture. If American Indian tribes as sovereigns
and American Indian culture are to survive, they can only
survive in the United States.
If, despite the backdrop of international law and sovereignty, there has been this seemingly complete domestication
of federal Indian law issues, one might well expect American
courts to be more generous in interpreting the Constitution as
a source of protections for Indians than for noncitizen immigrants. Remarkably, however, constitutional judicial review
has made more inroads into congressional power over immi47.

See Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 253 (1924) (codified

as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994) and conferring citizenship upon "all

non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States").
48. Before the passage of the Citizenship Act of 1924, the citizenship of a
Native American generally depended upon the effect of particular federal
statutes or treaties upon her tribe. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 46, at 642-45. This was so because the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which conferred citizenship upon all persons born "in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,
was held inapplicable to Indians who had been born under tribal authority
(and thus had been immediately subject to the primary jurisdiction of their
tribe, not the federal government). See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 104-09
(1884). Because no foreign nation could confer citizenship upon Indians, see
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 544 (explaining that the colonizing European nation had
exclusive relationship of sovereignty with tribes within its colonial domain),
Indians who were not citizens of the United States were apparently without
citizenship under international law.
49. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
50. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A Response to
"Indiansas Peoples," 39 UCLA L. REV. 169, 170 (1991).
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gration than over Indian affairs. 1
Until this year, an overview of congressional plenary
power over Indian affairs was simple. As one leading commen52
tator put it, "[w]hatever Congress wants, Congress gets."
53 the Court invalidated
This year, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
a federal statutory provision concerning Indian affairs on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Assessing whether Seminole Tribe
signals any meaningful departure from the heretofore established pattern of judicial restraint first requires an understanding of what at least had been the settled nature of plenary power.
Although, as Kagama itself strongly implies, the text of the
Constitution lacks much of a hint of any plenary power, 54 the
Court had never struck down a federal statute regulating Indian affairs on structural constitutional grounds until Seminole Tribe. Structural constitutional principles have not
stopped Congress from invading-indeed, even abolishingtribal sovereignty, 55 or from intruding upon core state functions
in regulating Indian affairs. 6 Similarly, in this area, the Court
51. See Legomsky, supra note 26, and Motomura, supra note 26, for interesting analyses of inroads upon plenary power in immigration law.
52. Newton, supra note 20, at 285.
53. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
54. See supra text accompanying note 16 (noting the Constitution's relative silence regarding Indian relations).
55. See, e.g., Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 250,
repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-197, § 3(b), 87 Stat. 770 (1973) (mandating federal
supervision over the property and members of the Menominee Indian Tribe of
Wisconsin). In Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), the
Court narrowly interpreted the Termination Act to preserve pre-existing
hunting and fishing rights. See id. at 411.
56. Courts originally understood the federal power to exclude states from
any role on an Indian reservation. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 561 (1832). Later, the Supreme Court interpreted treaties as reserving
rights of access to off-reservation resources necessary for the reservation and
rejected any federalism objection to these rights. See Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564, 574-78 (1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371,
377-84 (1905). In Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-62, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22, 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(1994)), Congress unilaterally delegated criminal jurisdiction over Indian
country to several states and gave the other states the unilateral option to
embrace this scheme as well. Congress provided states with no funding for
these increased governmental services. Recently, Congress preempted all
state laws prohibiting or burdening the use of peyote as a sacrament in a Native American religious service. See Pub. L. No. 103-344, § 2, 108 Stat. 3125
(1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994)). Another fairly recent federal
statute invading the core police power is the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994). But see infra note 75 (citing case law narrowly
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has never acknowledged any fundamental constitutional
rights, such as the right to tribal or cultural integrity. Nor has
the Court provided serious scrutiny to claims that tribes or individuals, whether Indian or non-Indian, have been subjected
to discriminatory federal classifications based on race, 57 even
though a complete Title of the United States Code is replete
with classifications that turn on Indian status.5 8 Indeed, only
relatively recently did the Court explicitly repudiate the extraordinary notion that congressional acts in the field of Indian
affairs are nonjusticiable political questions. 9 The Court has
continued to use "plenary power" as a term of art in federal
Indian law and has routinely assumed that the power is somehow both authorized in Article 16° and immune from meaningful scrutiny under other constitutional6 1provisions that ordinarily constrain congressional authority.
interpreting the Act). For discussion of whether the judicial refusal to protect
states against such federal legislation will continue, see infra text accompanying notes 73-76.
57. See infra note 74 (describing the Court's treatment of federal Indian
law as based on a political rather than racial classification).
58. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-4061 (1994).
59. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371,413 (1980); Delaware
Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977).
60. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)
("The central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress
with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.").
61. To my knowledge, in only four cases before Seminole Tribe has the
Court found constitutional infirmity with a congressional action involving Indians. In Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 351-63 (1911), the statute
called upon the courts to issue an advisory opinion. In three other cases, the
Court found an invasion of individual property rights. See Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704, 713-18 (1987); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 677-78 (1912);
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1899); cf United States v. Sioux Nation,
448 U.S. at 423-24 (upholding an award of compensation for taking of tribal
lands). Thus, the Court has never invalidated a statute on the ground that it
violated any collective tribal sovereignty interests. The current general standard for constitutional review of federal action in Indian affairs is supposed to
be a modified rational basis test inquiring whether "the special treatment can
be tied rationally to the filfillment of Congress's unique obligation toward the
Indians." Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 74 (1977)
(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)). This standard may
seem slightly more aggressive than the usual rational-basis inquiry. See, e.g.,
Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beech Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 309 (1993) (implying that a congressional regulation of cable television
providers would withstand constitutional scrutiny if justified by "any conceivable rational basis"). In practice, however, the Indian law test and gardenvariety rational basis review seem indistinguishable in their extreme deference to legislative judgments. See Washington v. Confederated Bands and
Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501-02 (1979) (explaining
that classifications in the Indian law context are "valid unless they bear no
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By virtue of its plenary power, Congress has run roughshod over tribal interests. As Kagama illustrates, it has federalized criminal regulation in Indian country. 2 Under the
policy of allotment, Congress deprived Indians of more than
two-thirds of their land base between 1887 and 1934.63 As alrational relationship to the State's objectives"); United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny because "federal
regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon impermissible classifications").
62. In addition to the Major Crimes Act upheld in Kagama, which provides federal jurisdiction over serious offenses committed by an Indian in Indian country, federal jurisdiction is also available under 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1994), which brings general federal criminal laws into Indian country for
"interracial crimes" (where the victim or defendant is Indian and the other
person concerned is non-Indian). The general federal criminal laws include
the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994), which purports to incorporate by reference all state criminal law needed to fill gaps in the federal
criminal provisions. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction
over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARIZ. L.
REV. 503, 504-76 (1976) (exploring the conflicts in jurisdiction among federal,
state and tribal courts).
63. See HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 46, at 138. Under allotment, "surplus lands" on the reservation became available for nonIndian homesteading. See id. The United States took much of the remainder
of tribal land out of collective ownership and carved it up into small allotments held in trust for individual Indians. See id. When the trust period expired, the allottees often lost the allotted land, because it became alienable
and subject to state taxation, and, ultimately, tax foreclosure. See ARELL
MORGAN GIBSON, THE AMERICAN INDIAN: PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT 50710 (1980).
Lone Wolf refused to entertain any constitutional challenge to allotment,
which was arguably the most disastrous policy in Indian affairs next to the
outright massacre or forced removal of Indians from their homelands. The
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-62 (1994)), forbids further allotments and extends into perpetuity the
trust restrictions on allotted land. The statute did not purport to undo its
past effects, however. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1992). Today,
much land remains in the allotment format. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,
467 (1984). On allotted reservations, a "checkerboard" pattern of land ownership has resulted: some land is tribal land, some land is owned by non-Indians
in fee simple, and some land remains as allotments for individual Indians. Id.
Criminal and civil jurisdiction over such areas is difficult for any sovereign to
exercise. Id. at 471-72 n.12. Moreover, because in many circumstances the
allotments are too small for the individual allottee to farm, ranch, or harvest
natural resources such as timber effectively, and because over the generations
the beneficial ownership of many allotments has passed by intestate succession and is now owned in small fractional shares by many descendants, the
federal government as trustee is left with the management responsibilities for
allotments almost by default. The federal government has not always husbanded these resources consistent with its fiduciary responsibilities. For discussion of the overall problem in a series of decisions that ultimately upheld a
finding of breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the United States, see United
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ready mentioned,6 in the 1950s, a Congress bent on assimilating Indians actually passed legislation that purported to terminate the sovereignty of a number of tribes. 65 In that era,
Congress also delegated criminal jurisdiction in Indian country
to several states and provided the rest of the states with the
unilateral authority to opt into this scheme, 66 all the while
providing the states with no financial assistance to pay for
these new responsibilities.
That the constitutional void in federal Indian law is harsh,
anomalous, and merits reconsideration seems beyond question.
Several scholars have taken up this point, contending that
congressional plenary power is neither authorized by constitutional text nor consistent with constitutional limitations on
federal authority. 67 Although these criticisms have made no
inroads upon the federal judiciary, perhaps federal Indian law
reformers can at least take heart that they now have allies in
an allied field. In recent years, several scholars have lamented
the anomalous status of immigration law and proposed reforms
to neuter the plenary power doctrine by bringing the field into
68
the mainstream of contemporary public law.
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224-28 (1983) and United States v. Mitchell,
445 U.S. 535, 536-46 (1980).
64. See supra text accompanying note 55 (discussing congressional abolition of tribal sovereignty).
65. See Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Boggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. IND. L. REV. 139, 158-62 (1977).
66. See Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1161-62, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)). It was only
in 1968 that Congress gave tribes any say in the matter, and then only for future attempts by states to opt into this arrangement. See Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78, 81 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
1321-22 (1994)).
67. See Milner Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1; Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33
STAN. L. REV. 979 (1981); Newton, supra note 20. For a debate over the nature and appropriateness of the plenary power, see Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIs. L. REv. 219;
Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over
the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams' Algebra, 30
ARIz. L. REv. 413 (1988); and Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live
with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live
with the PlenaryPower of Congress over the Indian Nations, 30 Ariz. L. Rev.
439 (1988).
68. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the
Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862 (1989); Louis Henkin, The Constitution
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Prog-
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Hiroshi Motomura, for example, argues that the mainstreaming of immigration law is already occurring through the
use of procedural protections rooted in the Due Process Clause
as a disguised way of developing substantive rights. 69 Motomura persuasively contends that a more direct constitutional
approach would remove many of the remaining idiosyncrasies
of immigration law, including subjecting classifications disadvantaging immigrants to meaningful equal protection challenge.
Indeed, the analogy between classifications based on immigration and those based on the paradigmatic equal protection concern-race-seems powerful. Those victimized by
immigration law often seem to have discrete and insular minority status, and their legal complaint is that, although they
are similarly situated to citizens in all relevant respects, they
are being harshly and dissimilarly treated. 70 The reform
movement in immigration law seeks to uncouple the immigrant from any collective sovereignty (her country of citizenship) so that she is seen as an individual. When so viewed, this
individual is similarly situated to citizens in most relevant respects and, therefore, deserves similar treatment in most instances. This is the classic equal protection argument in the
post-Brown v. Board of Education era: the message is to conceive of outsiders not as members of some inferior group, but as
individuals who deserve the same treatment afforded those
who are insiders. In short, the argument is individualistic, integrationist, and constitutionally conventional. It contends
that the backdrop of international law and group sovereignty
to immigration law, which is the basis for the harsh doctrines
disadvantaging immigrants vis-A-vis citizens, should, in the
face of a persuasive demonstration that immigrants and citizens are similarly situated, be replaced by more normatively
attractive, less anomalous, and more conventional American
eny, 100 HARv. L. REV. 853 (1987); Legomsky, supra note 26; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary CongressionalPower,
1984 Sup. CT. REV. 255; Motomura, supra note 26; Hiroshi Motomura, ImmigrationLaw After a Century of PlenaryPower: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 600-13 (1990); Peter H.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 317,
341-90 (1984).
69. See Motomura, supra note 26, at 1656-704. For a discussion of other
potential constitutional inroads upon plenary power in immigration law, see
Legomsky, supra note 26, at 930-34 and Legomsky, supra note 68, at 296-303.
70. See supra note 46 (describing the theory of "discrete and insular minorities").
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domestic public law doctrines. It is, then, an effort to domesticate immigration law, in more than one sense.
Domestication by mainstreaming is not, however, the answer to what ails federal Indian law. Although both immigration law and federal Indian law share a plenary power based
on outmoded notions of sovereignty, there the similarity of the
fields may end. The most normatively attractive aspects of
federal Indian law have respected tribal independence and federal supremacy over state governments in Indian affairs."' The
71. This conclusion is, of course, based on a cluster of normative and empirical judgments that are subject to debate. Essentially all major scholarship
in federal Indian law is based on similar assumptions and focuses not so much
on the appropriateness of the conclusion, but on how best to implement it in
our public law. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 67, at 989-90 (calling for respect
of tribal sovereignty in order to protect Indian culture); Frickey, supra note
14, at 383-84 (citing the absence of constitutional language relating to Indian
relations as evidence of the framers' intention to respect tribal soverignty);
Williams, The Algebra of FederalIndian Law: The Hard Trailof Decolonizing
and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, supra note 67, at

294-97 (calling for the tribal nations to assert their "legal voice and systematically combat the abuse of their human rights"). Several recent symposia on
federal Indian law topics reveal these shared assumptions. See Indian Law
Symposium, 46 ARK L. REV. 1 (1994); Symposium, Rules of the Game: Sovereignty and the Native American Nation, 27 CONN. L. REV. 495 (1995). Of

course, simply because a normative conclusion seems self-evident to the
scholars working in the field does not make it correct.
This is not the place for a full-blown defense of these working assumptions. In a nutshell, my own belief that these assumptions are correct is based
on the following conclusions. Our Western traditions of limited government,
consent of the governed, and respect for personal autonomy-embodied in
that bundle of familiar assumptions we make in constitutional law, torts,
property, and contracts-are simply incompatible with our history and our
contemporary experience of colonizing this continent by unilaterally displacing indigenous peoples, either without any manifestation of consent or with
inadequate consent found in documents written and negotiated in a foreign
language against a backdrop of coercion. The justifications articulated at the
time of colonization have little salience today. See infra text accompanying
notes 78-84 (noting historical justifications for colonization). In addition, the
international community has all but repudiated future acts of colonization.
See infra note 177 (describing the international decolonization movement).
Moreover, as a practical matter, even arguably well-meaning but unilateral
non-Indian efforts to assimilate Indians have been abject failures. See, e.g.,
Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 63-76 (1995)
(discussing the allotment of reservations at the end of the nineteenth century
and efforts in the 1950s to terminate tribes and to encourage relocation of reservation Indians to urban centers). A strong argument can be made, then, not
simply from principles of autonomy but also from the perspective of comparative institutional competence, that tribes ought to be presumed the appropriate decisionmakers concerning their futures. In addition to these historical,
theoretical, institutional, and practical reasons, there are positivist justifications for tribal sovereignty and separation as well-American federal common
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most protective aspects of federal Indian law have thus viewed
Indians as having group rights-indeed, group sovereignty.
Unlike in immigration law, where the person seeking entry
and permanent residence in the United States ordinarily
should not be disadvantaged by his allegiance to another sovereign,7 21 in federal Indian law the tribal member's allegiance to
his tribe is the legitimate element that distinguishes her from
others. Uncoupling the tribal member from the sovereignty of
her tribe would destroy most of what is unique and worth preserving in federal Indian law. Unlike reform in immigration
law, federal Indian law must retain its collectivist, separatist,
and unique legal elements. Yet it is precisely those aspects of
federal Indian law that would be most jeopardized by the impulse to mainstream.
Indeed, there is a substantial risk that any diminution of
congressional plenary power over Indian affairs in the near future will be rooted in an impulse to mainstream the field-and
thus will come at the expense of the tribes, rather than for
their benefit. For the treatment of tribes not as ethnic enclaves, but as sovereigns independent from the states and involved in a dependent, government-to-government relationship
with the federal government, stands in stark contrast to the
current Court's impetus to protect state sovereignty from federal intermeddling 3 and to forbid the congressional use of ralaw has always allowed tribal sovereignty, albeit at the sufferance of Congress, and congressional policy since the 1950s has favored tribal selfdetermination. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 46,
at 182-88 (describing the abandonment of termination policy). For all these
reasons, it seems to me that, at a minimum, the burden of argumentative persuasion is on the opponent of tribal sovereignty and separateness.
72. This is not to suggest that arguments based on group affiliation or
sovereignty are necessarily irrelevant in immigration law. The argument that
immigration law should be reconceptualized by considering the immigrant as
an individual seems to me to be an intriguing and important one, but of
course, upon reflection, the scholars in the field might justifiably supplement
it with some arguments rooted in sovereignty or, of course, reject it altogether
in favor of some other theory.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626-34 (1995)
(invalidating a congressional attempt to criminalize possession of guns near
schools pursuant to the Commerce Clause); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992) (invalidating as violative of the Tenth Amendment a
congressional mandate that forces states that have failed to develop a plan for
storage of low-level radioactive waste to take title to it).
For a recent decision invalidating a federal Indian statute on constitutional structural grounds involving the separation of powers rather than federalism, see South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior,69 F.3d 878,
881-89 (8th Cir. 1995) (invalidating § 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:31

cial classifications even for the benefit of historically disadvantaged groups.7 4 Moreover, the Court's current literalist approach to the interpretation of statutes and other positive law
is deeply inconsistent with the interpretive practices of federal
Indian law, where canons of interpretation have stood guard
against the abuse of the plenary power by protecting Indian
rights and interests against all but explicit congressional deprivation. 5
The Court's recent decision in Seminole Tribe fits uneasily
within either this prevailing understanding of an essentially
limitless congressional plenary power or my proposed reconception of it. Seminole Tribe held that the Eleventh Amendment forbids Congress from subjecting a state to suit in federal
U.S.C. § 465 (1995), under the theretofore long dormant nondelegation doctrine).
74. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2106-18 (1995)
(overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497
U.S. 547, 563-601 (1990), and holding that a congressionally adopted racial
affirmative action classification is subject to strict scrutiny). In federal Indian
law, federal measures that turn on Indian status are considered political, not
racial, classifications, and the courts do not subject them to stringent constitutional review. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541-55 (1974)
(upholding a federal statute providing Indians an employment and promotion
preference for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs). The theory is that,
because of the sovereign relationship between the federal government and the
tribes, classifications based on Indian status turn on political, not racial, considerations. See id. at 554. If the Court returned to this issue with its current
vigilance, however, it might well be troubled by the fact that in Mancari ethnicity was a "but for" requirement of obtaining the benefit in that case. See
id. at 554 n.24 (giving preference only to those who, in addition to belonging to
a federally recognized Indian tribe, had "one-fourth or more degree Indian
blood"); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 50, at 172-85 (discussing the "mixed"
classification in Mancari); Newton, supra note 20, at 271-88 (same). To be
sure, the Court in Adarand Constructors may have indicated a desire not to
reopen such issues in areas "in which we found special deference to the political branches of the Federal Government to be appropriate." Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2108 (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88
(1976), a case involving a federal alienage classification). Nonetheless, just
how Mancari might be squared with the Adarand Court's admonition that
"'[amny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a
most searching examination,'" 115 S. Ct. at 2100, is left open to question
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986)).
75. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 417; infra text accompanying notes 239244 (describing canons of interpretation in the Indian law context). For a recent case that combined the concerns about constitutional structure and racial
classifications in a manner that skewed statutory interpretation, see In re
Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 519-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (narrowly interpreting the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963, to avoid
doubts about its constitutionality based on federalism and Fifth Amendment
substantive due process and equality limitations).
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court to enforce a congressionally created duty to bargain with
a tribe concerning gaming in Indian country. The Court
treated the case as one that involved nothing uniquely related
to the governance of Indian affairs. Indeed, it conflated the
Indian Commerce Clause with all the rest of Congress's Article
I powers and held that the Eleventh Amendment uniformly
prohibited subjecting a state to federal judicial jurisdiction, regardless of the source of Article I power Congress sought to exercise. On the one hand, Seminole Tribe may signal a new
sensitivity to states' rights in federal Indian law. Any stringent constitutional protection of state sovereignty from federal
regulatory power is likely to have serious implications for federal Indian law, where the governance of Indian affairs has
generally been viewed as a matter exclusively for Congress by
virtue of its plenary power. On the other hand, Seminole Tribe
may indicate that tribes and individual Indians should renew
efforts to persuade the federal judiciary to recognize congressional power over Indian affairs as subject to meaningful constitutional constraints.7 6
If the federal courts are to become more receptive to tribal
interests, it will require a greater appreciation for what is
unique about federal Indian law, what legitimately distinguishes it from the mainstream. I have argued that a revival
of the legacy of the Marshall Court in federal Indian law would
produce such a greater appreciation for tribal interests.17 The
Marshall Court incorporated into our public law a complex
combination of judicial restraint and activity in addressing the
colonization of this country. To achieve that synthesis, as the
next section documents, the Marshall Court simultaneously
ratified international law notions that colonization was lawful
and that indigenous peoples possessed sovereignty and at least
a limited set of legal rights. It is only through an understand76. Perhaps the most likely scenario is that Seminole Tribe will have little effect on federal Indian law. As on other occasions, an Indian law case
may have been the vehicle for addressing a larger issue. See Rennard Strick-

land, The Absurd Ballet of American Indian Policy, or American Indian
Struggling with Ape on Tropical Landscape:An Afterword, 31 MAINE L. REv.

213, 220 (1979) (criticizing a case in which the legal rights of Indians were
"subordinated in the name of the public policy of national debt reduction"). A
majority of the Court wished to hold that Congress may not abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by use of its Article I powers, overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1989), along the way.
Seminole Tribe was simply the first case involving the Article I/Eleventh
Amendment question to get to the Court.
77. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 427-40.
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ing of the Marshall Court's Indian law jurisprudence that the
emergence of "plenary power" a half-century later makes sense.
What this inquiry reveals is that federal Indian law-and the
Constitution upon which this law is built-incorporates international law root and branch. If, as I shall contend, international law provides the best justification for a kind of federal
plenary power in Indian affairs, logic demands that international law also suggest limitations on that power. The blending of international and domestic principles also provides a
practical amalgamation of contemporary norms against which
to judge the current condition of indigenous peoples.
II. PLENARY POWER YESTERDAY: THE
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
By what right did European countries colonize this conti78
nent? Justice McLean, concurring in Worcester v. Georgia,
provided perhaps the most forthright discussion of this issue in
American law:
The abstract right of every section of the human race to a reasonable
portion of the soil, by which to acquire the means of subsistence, cannot be controverted. And it is equally clear, that the range of nations
or tribes, who exist in the hunter state, may be restricted within reasonable limits. They shall not be permitted to roam, in the pursuit of
game, over an extensive and rich country, whilst in other parts, human beings are crowded so closely together, as to render the means of
subsistence precarious. The law of nature, which is paramount to all
other laws, gives the right to every nation, to the enjoyment of a reasonable extent9 of country, so as to derive the means of subsistence
from the soil!

These conclusions are, of course, rooted in the law of nations-the international80 law-that prevailed during the
American colonial period.
78. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 563-96 (1832).
79. Id. at 579 (McLean, J., concurring).
80. For recent, thorough, and critical discussions of these international
assumptions, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) and Howard R. Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and International Law, 1600-1776, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE 125 (Oren Lyons
et al. eds., 1992). For influential commentary preceding the early American
colonial period, see FRANcIsCUS DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IUREE BELLI
RELECTIONES (Carnegie Inst. ed. 1917) (originally published in 1532). See
generally Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of
the United States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1 (1942) (tracing and comparing treatment of
Indian rights by the United States and Spanish governments). For a scholarly assessment of the international law concerning colonization roughly con-
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Chief Justice Marshalls foundational opinions for the Supreme Court in federal Indian law-in Worcester and two earlier cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia81 and Johnson v. McIntosh8 2-never squarely addressed the legality or the morality of
the colonization of America. He did refer to a variety of potential justifications, 83 but his essential conclusion was that the
Court "will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturalists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to contract their limits."8 In words that resemble the
Lone Wolf Court's refusal, eighty years later, to entertain
challenges to unilateral Indian treaty abrogation by Congress, 85 Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "[c]onquest gives a
[land] title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny,
whatever the private and speculative opinions of 86individuals
may be, respecting the original justice of the claim."
temporaneous with the Marshall Court, see EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS (1st Am. Ed. 1796), upon which the Marshall Court relied in Worcester. See infra note 105 (noting that the Court quotes Vattel's treatise in its
decision). In the text, I focus on the approach adopted by the Supreme Court
to incorporate international norms into American domestic law rather than
examine the background norms themselves as an historical matter.
81. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
82. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
83. In his first discussion, Marshall stated:
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of
Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they
could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample field to
the ambition and enterprise of all; and the character and religion of
its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people
over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendency.
The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in convincing
themselves that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of
the new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited independence.
Id. at 572-73.
84. Id. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25, 41-43 (describing how Lone
Wolf concluded that Congress has virtually unlimited power over Indian affairs); see also infra text accompanying notes 131-133 (noting that Lone Wolf
likened Indians to foreigners within the borders of the United States).
86. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588. Nine years after Johnson, Marshall returned to the issue of colonization:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited
by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of
each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their
own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is difficult to
comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of
the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the
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It is obvious that this conclusion, although guised in terms
of nonjusticiability, in effect ratified the basic assumptions of
historical colonization, which were consistent with the law of
nations during the so-called "age of discovery." 87 Thus, the Supreme Court acquiesced in the fundamental approach taken to
the European settlement of what became the United States. In
particular, the Court in Johnson embraced the doctrine that,
upon "discovery" of the continent by Europeans, Indian rights
in land were diminished to a sort of aboriginal title 8 8-usually
called "original Indian title"8 9 -that amounted to an occupancy
at the sufferance of the "discovering" European sovereign.
That sovereign could extinguish original Indian title "either by
purchase or by conquest." ° The tribe was involuntarily thrust
into an exclusive sovereign-to-sovereign relationship with that
European sovereign, which forbade the tribe to have relations
with any other nation or to engage in land transactions with
discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in

the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its
ancient possessors.
After lying concealed for a series of ages, the enterprise of
Europe, guided by nautical science, conducted some of her adventurous sons into this western world. They found it in possession of a
people who had made small progress in agriculture or manufactures,
and whose general employment was war, hunting, and fishing.
Did these adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and occasionally landing on it, acquire for the several governments to whom they
belonged, or by whom they were commissioned, a rightful property in
the soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific; or rightful dominion over the
numerous people who occupied it? Or has nature, or the great Creator of all things, conferred these rights over hunters and fishermen,
on agriculturalists and manufacturers?
But power, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession,
are conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted by
those on whom they descend. We proceed, then, to the actual state of
things, having glanced at their origin; because holding it in our recollection might shed some light on existing pretensions.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 (1832). This passage, although seemingly more sympathetic than the language in Johnson quoted in
the text accompanying note 84, supra, likewise considers the historical issue
settled for American courts.
87. All that Chief Justice Marshall purported to do concerning colonization in his three foundational opinions was reflect "the actual state of things,"
a phrase he repeatedly used. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543, 546, 560.
88. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
89. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 28.
90. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587. In Worcester, however, Chief
Justice Marshall emphasized purchase as the appropriate method of obtaining
the Indian land estate. See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544-45.
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any entity or person other than that sovereign.9 1 Discovery did
not extinguish all tribal sovereignty, however-a tribe remained "a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself."92
Tribes ended up not as foreign states, though, but as "domestic
dependent nations . . . in a state of pupilage.""3 In language
that was later distorted in Kagama,94 Chief Justice Marshall
said that "[t]heir relation 95
to the United States resembles that
of a ward to his guardian.
It does not follow from these conclusions, however, that
American courts will never address an issue in federal Indian
law. Indeed, I have argued that, although Marshall viewed the
historical aspects of colonization as so well settled that they
could not be considered judicially, his decisions treated future
exercises of colonial power as subject to judicial evaluation as a
matter of domestic American law.96 In fact, in Worcester the
Supreme Court dramatically rejected Georgia's efforts to exercise a police power within an Indian reservation in that state.
Marshall wrote for the Court that the tribe was a distinct entity "occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with
the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of congress." 97
Marshall reached this conclusion based on his understanding of three aspects of the colonial process, all of which are in
tension with later decisions of the Supreme Court. The firstinconsistent with Kagama98 -was that the exercise of a EuroAmerican police power within Indian country was an extraordinary idea inconsistent with the practices of Great Britain. 99
91. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
92. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
93. Id. at 17.
94. See infra note 113 (quoting the Court's description of Indian tribes as
'wards of the nation" in Kagama).
95. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
96. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 385-406.
97. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19 (explaining how Kagama
justified federal intrusion in intratribal affairs).
99. Great Britain had never attempted "to interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers,
who, as traders or otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances."
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 547. Indeed, "[t]he king purchased their lands
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Second, by virtue of the American revolution, the control over
colonization had shifted from the British Crown to the United
States government. Although the Articles of Confederation
created ambiguity about the allocation of power over Indian affairs between the federal government and the states,10 0 the
Constitution had resolved that ambiguity in favor of Congress, 10 1 by assigning it exclusive authority over Indian affairs.'0 2 Ordinarily, therefore, state law had no role in Indian
country. This conclusion stands in stark contrast to current
trends in the Supreme Court, where state law is only occasionally preempted by the federal-tribal relationship. 0 3 Third,
even though a treaty with the tribe had language that could
rather easily be interpreted as a surrender of tribal independence, and therefore possibly a capitulation to the local police
power of Georgia,'O° Marshall resisted this interpretation. He
concluded that the pattern of treaties with the tribe
"recogniz[ed] their title to self government" rather than a surrender of it, and then squarely relied upon "the settled doctrine
of the law of nations" that "a weaker power does not surrender
its independence-its right of self government, by associating
with a stronger, and taking its protection."'
Based on this
when they were willing to sell, at a price they were willing to take; but never
coerced a surrender of them." Id. The king "also purchased their alliance and
dependence by subsidies; but never intruded into the interior of their affairs,
or interfered with their self government, so far as respected themselves only."
Id.
100. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation provided:
The united states in congress assembled, shall also have the sole and
exclusive right and power of... regulating the trade and managing
all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be
not infringed or violated.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. IX.

101. Marshall stated:
The correct exposition of this article is rendered unnecessary by the
adoption of our existing constitution. That instrument confers on
congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of
regulating commerce with... Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the
Indians. They are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions. The shackles imposed on this power, in the confederation, are
discarded.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
102. Id.
103. See infra note 162 (describing the current Court's treatment of state
regulation in Indian country).
104. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-57 (1832).
105. Id. at 561. Marshall continued:
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strong vision of tribal sovereignty, surviving all but the most
explicit extinguishment through colonization, Marshall created
the canons for interpreting Indian treaties. These canons are
designed to require a clear statement before the interpreter
06
may conclude that tribal sovereignty or rights have been lost.
In short, the Supreme Court in the Marshall trilogy embraced pre-constitutional notions of the colonial process, rooted
in the law of nations, involving both inherent tribal sovereignty
and a colonial prerogative vested exclusively in the centralized
government.10 7 Did this incorporation of international law into
the domestic law of Indian affairs survive the plenary power
era, over a half-century later? Standing alone, Kagama seemingly repudiates the notion that the incorporation of tribes and
their lands into the colonial government was to be consensual
108
and was to leave intact the internal sovereignty of the tribes.
Indeed, by itself, Kagama may appear to embrace the notion
that tribes had been degraded to the point of a dependency devoid of sovereignty. But Kagama cannot be viewed in isolation.
For example, a decade later, the Court vigorously reaffirmed
A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under
the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the
right of government, and ceasing to be a state. Examples of this kind
are not wanting in Europe. "Tributary and feudatory states," says
Vattel, "do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states,
so long as self government and sovereign and independent authority
are left in the administration of the state."
Id. (quoting, without citation to the source, the international law treatise of
Vattel).
106. In a nutshell, Marshall interpreted the treaty as the Indians would
have understood it, conceptualized the transaction as one in which the tribe
was reserving for itself all rights not clearly ceded to the United States, and,
more generally, understood the treaty as representing an ongoing relationship
of sovereignty between the tribe and the United States. See Frickey, supra
note 14, at 397-417. Unfortunately, those canons have had increasingly little
impact on the current Supreme Court. See id. at 418-26, 432-37.
107. See S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and InternationalLaw in Historicaland ContemporaryPractice,in 1989 HARV. INDIAN L.
SYMP. 191, 201-03 & nn. 50-56 (analyzing the Marshall Court reliance on Vattel's treatise in classifying tribes as sovereign states dependent on the United
States); Helen W. Winston, Comment, "An Anomaly Unknown": Supreme
Court Application of InternationalLaw Norms on Indigenous Rights in the
Cherokee Cases (1831-32), 1 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 339, 357-58 (1994)
(describing Marshall's incorporation of international law into the domestic law
of Indian affairs). Professor Anaya has returned to this subject in his most
recent book. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 16-19 (1996) [hereinafter ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES].
108. See supra text accompanying notes 12-19 (explaining the Kagama rationale).
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inherent tribal sovereignty.' °9 More generally, the entire plenary power era lends itself to the interpretation, consistent
with the Marshall decisions, that federal authority as well as
tribal sovereignty is inherent under international law, and that
these competing powers are to be mediated by conceiving of
tribes as dependent sovereigns-that is, sovereign with respect
to their internal affairs while subject to supervening federal
control.
Kagama was not simply the first plenary power case, but
also a judicial response to congressional objection to an earlier
decision faithful to Marshall's constructs. In Ex parte Crow
Dog," ° the Supreme Court refused to find federal jurisdiction
to prosecute the alleged murder in Indian country of one Indian by another. Consistent with the Marshall legacy, which
requires courts to use the canons of interpretation to buffer attempts at non-Indian intrusion into tribal affairs, the Court
construed imprecise language in a treaty and a later agreement with the tribe as not embodying tribal consent to federal
criminal jurisdiction."' As noted earlier, Congress responded
immediately by adopting a statute providing federal criminal
jurisdiction for certain serious offenses committed by Indians
in Indian country." 2 In Kagama, the Court deferred to the
congressional power to enact this statute. The Court essentially assumed that some non-Indian sovereignty must have
the ultimate authority to intrude upon internal tribal sovereignty, and that the federal government was preferable to the
states because it had been dealing exclusively with tribes,
alone had the capacity to enact general legislation sweeping
across all tribes, and alone was responsible for the deprivations
that colonization had caused." 3
109. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5 (discussing the Court's recognition of tribal sovereignty in Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)).
110. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
111. See id. at 572.
112. See supra text accompanying note 15 (discussing the Major Crimes
Act).
113. The Court in Kagama stated:
[Tihese Indians are within the geographical limits of the United
States. The soil and the people within these limits are under the political control of the Government of the United States, or of the
States of the Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two ....

The territorial governments owe all their

powers to the statutes of the United States conferring on them the
powers which they exercise, and which are liable to be withdrawn,
modified, or repealed at any time by Congress.... [T~his power of
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Kagama, then, is more complex than first appears. The
decision indicates that Congress has power over Indian affairs
based more on inherent notions of centralized national power
in a colonial government than on a strict interpretation of the
congressional powers enumerated in the Constitution. It is, to
that extent, an extension of the Marshall trilogy. Marshall
thought that the Constitution, by providing Congress with
power over war, treaties, and the regulation of commerce with
tribes, "comprehend[s] all that is required for the regulation of
our intercourse with the Indians"1 14 because he assumed that
the historical pattern of noninterference with internal tribal
matters would continue.' 15 These and other conventional constitutional arguments were not available in Kagama, however." 6 The reliance in Kagama upon the inherent powers of
Congress to organize territorial governments, and make laws for
their inhabitants, arises not so much from the clause in the Constitution in regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations
concerning the Territory and other property of the United States, as
from the ownership of the country in which the Territories are, and
the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the National
Government, and can be found nowhere else.
It seems to us that this [statute] is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for
their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are
found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness
and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.
This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress,
and by this court, whenever the question has arisen [citing Worcester
v. Georgia,31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)].
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom
they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within
the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never
been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-80, 383-85 (1886) (other citations
omitted).
114. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 98-106 (outlining Marshall's understanding of the reluctance to impose "police power" in Indian country).
116. As Nell Jessup Newton has explained:
In the first place, congressional power to regulate activities within
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the centralized sovereign for colonial purposes is consistent,
however, with Marshall's understanding of the allocation of the
colonial power." 7 If there is any fundamental disagreement
between Kagama and the Marshall trilogy, it is whether the
power to interfere in internal tribal matters is a necessary attribute of the ongoing, centralized colonial power. Whatever
the extent of that power, however, Marshall sought to limit it
by interpretive canons designed to force Congress, not the localities, to make the difficult decisions, and to require the judiciary to neuter colonizing acts disadvantageous to tribes unless the language of the positive law was clear in that regard.
Crow Dog was consistent with this tradition.
This understanding of Kagama-in which notions of inherent, centralized colonial sovereignty rather than simple reliance upon the language of the Constitution explain the plenary power in Indian affairs 18-makes it fit in well with the
decisions that followed it. In particular, it makes Kagama
consistent with the approach taken to the plenary power over
immigration affairs three years later in the Chinese Exclusion
Case, which was then transplanted into Indian affairs in Lone
Wolf.
Recall that in the Chinese Exclusion Case the Court refused to entertain a challenge to a unilateral congressional abrogation of an international treaty." 9 Just where did Congress
get this plenary power over immigration? 2 ° According to the
the territories [by virtue of the property clause] could not be invoked,
because the land was within the state of California. Nor could the
power to regulate Indian commerce be used, since at that time, the
Court required a direct nexus with commerce to sustain federal laws
regulating interstate and Indian commerce. The power to enact a
criminal code applicable within the states, although fairly wellestablished today, was beyond the grant of power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes in 1885. Finally, the congressional power to
effectuate treaties with Indian tribes was similarly inapplicable, since
no treaty was involved.
Newton, supra note 20, at 213-14 (citations omitted).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19 (describing the Kagama rationale).
118. Nonetheless, the argument for centralizing the power over Indian affairs in the federal government can be bolstered by constitutional text as well
as relatively conventional interpretive techniques. See infra text accompanying notes 153-163 (noting constitutional authority for centralized power over
Indian affairs, including provisions authorizing the powers of treaty, war,
territory, and commerce over Indian tribes).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40 (describing the Court's
holding in the Chinese Exclusion Case).
120. For a succinct and insightful analysis that has informed this discus-
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Court, the control over the influx of foreigners is an inherent
power of every nation under international law.12 ' The Court
stressed that, when sovereignty involving national rather than
local purposes and involving the entire national territory was
concerned, that sovereignty resided in Congress. 122 The Court
reinforced this theme three years later, in Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States,'23 where, in upholding the Immigration Act of
1891,124 it stated:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to
self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the United States this power is
vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has
committed the 25entire control of international relations, in peace as
well as in war.'

Just one year later, the Court upheld congressional power
to deport aliens on the same ground 126 and quoted leading insion, see Aleinikoff, supra note 68, at 863-64.
121. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
122. The Court stated:
That the government of the United States, through the action of the
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction
over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude
aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another
power....
While under our Constitution and form of government the great
mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United
States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with power which belongs to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance
of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory....
The control of local matters being left to local authorities, and
national matters being entrusted to the government of the Union, the
problem of free institutions existing over a widely extended country,
having different climates and varied interests has been happily
solved. For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but
for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations,
we are but one people, one nation, one power.
Chinese Exclusion, 130 U.S. at 603-06.
123. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
124. Ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1889-1891) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (1994)).
125. NishimuraEkiu, 142 U.S. at 659 (citations omitted).
126. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (stating
that the deportation power is "an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and
its welfare").
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ternational law scholars in support of this conclusion.' 27
This approach is obviously consistent with Kagama. The
Chinese Exclusion Case and Nishimura Ekiu concluded that
the centralized national government must have inherent and
plenary power over the immigration of foreigners; Kagama
reached a similar conclusion about- power over. "foreigners" already in the midst of a colonial country-unassimilated, tribal,
non-citizen, indigenous peoples. As to such persons, the colonizing government never had the opportunity, in the language
of Nishimura Ekiu, "to admit them" into the country "only in
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe." Whatever conditions are placed upon indigenous peoples by colonizing authorities must either be consensual (by
treaties, for example) or unilateral (by the exercise of a plenary
colonizing power). Kagama essentially stands for the proposition that in a colonized nation the centralized government has
inherent power over the indigenous persons who are the victims of colonization.
In addition to allocating governmental power, Kagama and
the Chinese Exclusion Case may share a similar policy concern.
In Kagama, the Court defended centralizing the power over
Indian affairs in part for fear that otherwise the states and localities would treat Indians idiosyncratically and harshly.'2 8
On the same day it decided Kagama, the Court also handed
down Yick Wo v. Hopkins.'29 In Yick Wo, the Court invalidated,
as a denial of equal protection, San Francisco ordinances designed to drive Chinese laundries out of business. The Court
concluded that "[n]o reason for [the laws] . . . exists except
hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners
belong." 13 0 Thus, when it decided the Chinese Exclusion Case,
the Court was surely aware of the special problems that lurked
if local or state power could intrude into immigration affairs.
The timing of Yick Wo, Kagama, and the Chinese Exclusion
Case seems significant in explaining their results and theories.
The Court in Lone Wolf then applied the principle of the
Chinese Exclusion Case to federal Indian law, holding that
Congress may unilaterally abrogate an Indian treaty without
consequence under domestic law. Lone Wolf stated that
127. See id. at 707-09 (quoting Vattel, Ortolan, Phillimore, and Bar).
128. See supra note 113 (quoting Kagama's description of states as the
"deadliest enemies" of Indians).
129. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
130. Id. at 374.
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"[plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has
been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power
has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government." 131 In so
holding, the Court in Lone Wolf assumed that, somewhat like
immigrants, "Indians who had not been fully emancipated from
the control and protection of the United States are subject, at
least so far as the tribal lands [are] concerned, to be controlled
by direct legislation of Congress."'32 As in Kagama, then, the
Court in Lone Wolf treated non-citizen tribal Indians as foreigners within the borders of the United States, the power over
whom was a national, not a local, concern. The rationale has
striking parallels to that underlying the power over immigration, as understood in the Chinese Exclusion Case and
133
NishimuraEkiu.
The third major plenary power case in federal Indian law,
United States v. Sandoval,134 demonstrates that the theory that
power over Indian affairs is inherent is the only rationale that
can possibly explain this area. In Sandoval, the question involved whether federal statutes governing the introduction of
liquor into Indian country 135 applied to the Santa Clara Pueblo.
The case presented a fascinating and novel factual situation,
for unlike the Indians involved in the typical case, the Santa

131. 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
132. Id. at 567. The Court in Lone Wolf also quoted the similar language
in Kagama, see supra note 113, concerning the power of the "General Government" over Indians. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
133. Contemporaneously with the rise of plenary power in federal Indian
law and immigration law, the Supreme Court had to address thorny and
somewhat analogous questions concerning another problem of sovereignty,
the application of the Constitution to "unincorporated" territories, such as
Puerto Rico. For two rather recent discussions of whether "the Constitution
follows the flag," see Gary Lawson, TerritorialGovernments and the Limits of
Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853 (1990), and Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991). For a discussion that includes consideration of federal Indian law, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, PuertoRico and the
Constitution:Conundrums and Prospects,11 CONST. COMM. 15 (1994). For an
argument that congressional plenary power in Indian affairs should be abandoned in favor of an approach, modeled after that taken with the former insular territories, whereby the United States would enter into consensual relationships with tribes, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and
State Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal SelfGovernment and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105
(1995).
134. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
135. Act of January 30, 1897, ch. 109, 29 Stat. 506 (1895-1897).
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Clara Pueblo possessed their lands in fee simple title rather
than some form of Indian title and allegedly were citizens of
the United States.13 6 In this case, therefore, it could not be argued that the power over these Indians flowed from the constitutional provision granting Congress the authority to control
property of the United States,13 7 even if that property were
broadly defined to include Indian trust lands. Nor was there
any treaty with the Santa Clara Pueblo in which the tribe
could have conferred plenary power upon Congress or could
have formally established a ward-guardian relationship. Nor
had there been any war with that tribe which could have
worked as a conquest. In order to regulate "commerce" with
the tribe in commodities such as alcohol, Congress would have
had to deem tribal members "Indians" despite all these factors.
It was difficult, however, to see how in law the Santa Clara
Pueblo were any different from non-Indian citizens within the
United States who happened to be ethnically homogeneous and
had formed themselves into a self-governing voluntary association.
The Court in Sandoval nonetheless held that congressional power reached the Santa Clara Pueblo, on the grounds
that they were ethnically Indians and that the federal government had dealt with them as such. Relying upon the language
in Kagama about the power of the "general government" over
Indians, the Court in Sandoval stated:
[Liong continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken
current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a
superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a
fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities
within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently
acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a
8
State.13

In Sandoval, the Court for the first time suggested a judicially enforceable limitation upon plenary power in Indian affairs, and that limitation demonstrates that the power in
question is one of inherent sovereignty rather than one strictly
rooted in constitutional text. The Court stated:
[Ilt is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or

136. These unusual features were the result of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hildalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Spain, T.S. No. 207, which ended the MexicanAmerican war and protected the residents of what became New Mexico from
the loss of any rights that had been recognized or granted by the Spanish.
137. See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
138. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 45-46.
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body of people within the range of this power by arbitrarily calling
them an Indian tribe, but only that in respect of distinctly Indian
communities the questions whether, to what extent, and for what
time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes reStates are to
quiring the guardianship and protection of the United
39
be determined by Congress, and not by the courts.

As in Kagama and Lone Wolf, the Court in Sandoval considered Indians-even fee-simple-owning citizens--"the other,"
not full-fledged members of the political community of the
United States unless and until Congress acts accordingly. In
short, the "territorial integrity" notion of inherent sovereignty
in the Chinese Exclusion Case and Nishimura Ekiu has an
analogue in the "political integrity" approach of Sandoval and
prior cases. In both lines of cases, the Court deferred to the
inherent power of the federal government, as centralized sovereign, to determine the integration of "foreigners" into the
Anglo-American polity. 4 ' The immigration cases involve the
inherent sovereignty of all nations; the Indian law cases involve the inherent sovereignty of all colonial nations.
Establishing that the power over Indian affairs, like the
power over immigration, is inherent and flows from international law does not, of course, legitimate it, either legally or
normatively. Legally, under a strict understanding of McCulloch v. Maryland,141 there is no such thing as an inherent congressional power: if the Constitution does not grant the power
to Congress, it does not have that power." Normatively, even
if there is such a thing as inherent sovereignty, it should be exercised only within appropriate limits.
One response to the legal concern is that the Court has
sanctioned inherent federal power in related sectors as well.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,14 3 the Court
concluded that "the powers of external sovereignty passed from
the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in
their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of
America" and therefore that "the investment of the federal gov139. Id. at 46.
140. That strong notion of deference continues today in the area of naturalization and citizenship, where federal classifications based on alienage receive only the most minimal of constitutional scrutiny. See Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 77-80 (1976).
141. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
142. For a discussion of this argument in the allied field of immigration,
see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND

PoLITICs IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 184-92 (1987).
143. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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ernment with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution."'" This
notion of inherent federal sovereignty over foreign affairs
resonates with Chief Justice Marshall's understanding of Indian affairs in the colonial period145 and is consistent with the
notion that the power over Indian affairs is an exercise of the
"external sovereignty" of a colonizing country. It is also consistent .with the understanding, explicitly adopted by the Court
during the plenary power era, that tribal sovereignty itself is
"extra-constitutional" authority derived under international
46
law.
To be sure, the language in Curtiss-Wright has been subjected to withering criticism, 47 but then so has the plenary
power in Indian affairs.'4 8 Nonetheless, the federal Indian af149
fairs power is hardly likely to be repudiated any time soon,
at least in a way that advantages tribes. Moreover, there are
aspects of that power that are worth saving. In Indian law, as
in immigration law, there are efficiencies in centralizing the
power in the federal government, and it does limit the opportunities of states and localities antagonistic to Indians and
immigrants to engage in discrimination. A uniform national
approach to the ongoing colonization of the country provides
tribes one legislative forum rather than fifty in which to focus
their energies and centralizes the significant legal issues in
one judiciary as well.
The real problem with the supposed plenary power is not
that it exists in the federal government versus the states, but
that the adjective "plenary" makes it seem unlimited. In other
words, the constitutional problem is not so much one of
whether the power should be attributed to Congress, whether

144. Id. at 316, 318.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 98-106 (describing Marshall's understanding of the colonial process).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5 (explaining that tribal sovereignty existed before the Constitution).
147. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTITUTION
19-26 (1972) (describing criticisms revealing "difficulties" in the CurtissWright theory); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation:An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973) (arguing
against the Court's conclusion in Curtiss-Wright).
148. See supra sources cited in note 67 (criticizing the plenary power in
Indian affairs).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61 (noting the Court's recent
use of "plenary power").
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through Article I or other legitimate means, but instead one of
what limits, if any, the Constitution or other sources of law
might place upon it. If the authority over Indian affairs is an
inherent attribute of national sovereignty in a colonial state, as
I have argued, the danger would be that the power would be
seen as wholly "extra-constitutional," and thereby beyond any
limiting force of the rule of law at all.
Yet the Supreme Court has repudiated this notion, formally abandoning Lone Wolfs nonjusticiability approach in favor of a very deferential application of constitutional limitations. 5 ° If ever so weakly, then, the Supreme Court has
assumed that what Congress does in Indian affairs is now
subject to judicial evaluation in general and constitutional constraint in particular. 51 As with other areas of federal power,
"plenary" should simply mean "complete," not "absolute." 52
The international law backdrop concerning colonization
provides a solid theory for legitimating this kind of federal
power over Indian affairs while simultaneously subjecting it to
limitations rooted in the Constitution and the canons of interpretation. 3 The Constitution is not a closed set of words, but
rather a document with a purpose: to establish constitutive institutions that, through an ongoing, interactive process, effectively govern the peoples and territory of this country.'54 The
nature, processes, and relationships of these governmental in-

150. See supra note 61 (describing rational basis review of federal statutes
concerning Indian affairs). Only time will tell whether Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), is an anomaly related to the current Court's enthusiasm for enforcing the Eleventh Amendment or instead signals some
movement away from judicial restraint in federal Indian law. See supra text
accompanying notes 75-76 (discussing the potential impact of Seminole Tribe).
151. The same has occurred in immigration law, where the Court has repeatedly said that congressional power is subject to constitutional limitations.
For examples of this conclusion, see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975), Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), and Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896).
152. This is, of course, the way Chief Justice Marshall described the federal plenary power over interstate and foreign commerce in Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
153. The argument that follows is derived from the evocative discussion in
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY

16-17 (3d ed. 1995).
154. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969) (elaborating on a theory of constitutional interpretation rooted in the structures and relationships created by the Constitution).
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stitutions must be understood within the framework in which
the country was created-that is, through colonization. As the
Marshall trilogy acknowledged, the United States simply could
not function as an Anglo-European society without some centralized and effective capacity to engage in sovereign relationships with Indian tribes concerning peace, land, membership
in the polity of the United States, and so forth. In short, because the sovereign nation that the constitutional framers set
out to establish resulted from a colonial process that would remain ongoing for the foreseeable future, if not forever, certain
centralized governmental powers are inherent in that enterprise and, therefore, are inherent in the Constitution itself.
This structural argument proposes that inherent in the
Constitution, not outside the Constitution, are all those notions
of inherent sovereignty under international law that are not
inconsistent with constitutional text, structures, or institutional relationships.' 55 In this light, the abandonment of the
ambiguous provision in the Articles of Confederation about
power over Indian affairs' 56 and the language in the Constitution about treaty power, war power, territorial power, and
power over commerce with Indian tribes provide strong reason
to conclude that the colonial power resides in Congress, not in
the states.' 57 A rather conventional route to this conclusion is
that a centralized and plenary authority over colonization was
"necessary and proper"' 5 8 for the achievement of the powers
expressly granted to Congress, including management of federal lands and territories,'5 9 naturalization of the citizenship of

155. Cf. Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 557 (1913) (Holmes, J.) ("It is admitted that sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and seemingly
that Congress is not deprived of this power by the Constitution of the United
States.").
156. See supra text accompanying notes 100-102 (describing this provision).
157. This was, of course, Chief Justice Marshall's own analysis that was
adopted by the Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
See supra note 101 (quoting this analysis). It is fully consistent with the understandings of the Framers. See FEDERALIST No. 42, at 268-69 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Letter from President George Washington to the Cornplanter, Half Town, and Great Tree, Chiefs and Counselors of
the Seneca Nation of Indians, (Dec. 29, 1790) in 31 WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 179, 180 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939); Timothy Joseph Preso,
A Return to Uncertainty in Indian Affairs: The Framers,the Supreme Court,
and the Indian Commerce Clause, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 443 (1994).

158. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
159. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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the polity, 160 admission of new states into the Union,161 and so
forth.
If this argument is accepted, it leaves the states completely
out of the picture in Indian affairs-the authority over Indian
affairs is both centralized and plenary, in the same sense that
the power over interstate commerce is centralized and plenary' 6 2 -unless Congress chooses to delegate some power to the

160. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
161. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
162. This conclusion is, after all, how federal Indian law started out in the
Marshall trilogy. See supra text accompanying notes 98-106 (describing Marshall's understanding of the colonial process). It also parallels the tack taken
in immigration law, where an analogous inherent authority has been considered exclusively federal. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63
(1941) ("When the national government by treaty or statute has established
rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations, or burdens of
aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the law of the land. No state can add to
or take from the force and effect of such treaty or statute.. . ."); Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 275, 280 (1875) ("The passage of laws which concern the admission of aliens and subjects of foreign nations belongs to Congress, and not to the states."). Moreover, as a functional matter, as the Court
itself recognized in Kagama, the complete federalization of this power would
promote institutional coordination of the federal-tribal sovereign relationship
and prevent the states from invading this domain with idiosyncratic or abusive local measures. See supra note 113 (quoting Kagama's recognition that
states are often the "deadliest enemies" of Indian tribes). On this understanding, Seminole Tribe could simply be understood as involving the immunity of
states from federal judicial jurisdiction, and not a sign that states have any
legislative authority in Indian affairs. See supra 76 (noting this possibility).
Nonetheless, acceptance of this approach would profoundly change contemporary federal Indian law. Currently, states may sometimes regulate in
Indian country. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding
state action did "not imperil any interest" of a tribe); id. at 438-47 (Stevens, J.,
joined by O'Connor, J.) (providing critical votes that a state may zone the
opened portion of a reservation, while a tribe may zone the closed remainder
of reservation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981)
(concluding that a state, not a tribe, may regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on non-member-owned fee land on a reservation); United States v.
McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881) (holding that a state court has exclusive
criminal jurisdiction over an offense committed in Indian country by a nonIndian against another non-Indian). The problem frequently manifests itself
on allotted reservations where non-Indians may own a significant share of the
land and make up a major proportion of the population. These demographics
might lead to the conclusion that the area has lost its "Indian character,"
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1984), and accordingly should not be
treated as Indian country. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S.
584, 588 n.3, 604-05 (1977) (noting large non-Indian presence in concluding
that allotment of reservation had diminished its boundaries); DeCoteau v.
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427-28 (1975) (same). The demographics
also might suggest that, even if the area in question is Indian country, tribal

70
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states.1 63 It still leaves undecided the nature and extent of federal power. To be sure, there is a strong argument that federal
power may flow only from express grants in the Constitution.
Because no constitutional provision clearly provides congressional authority over internal tribal matters, arguably any
congressional activity along those lines would, by analogy to
the foreign relations power, have to result either from conquest
or from negotiations.1 6 Alternatively, if the express powers of
sovereignty over non-Indians is implausible. Cf. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.1, 194-95 (1978) (noting large non-Indian presence on reservation while holding that the tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction
over a non-Indian resident of the reservation). Whatever might be said about
the arguable contextual sensitivity of these decisions, they cannot support the
assertion of state authority over non-Indians consensually involved in business activities on an unallotted reservation, at least so long as there are not
significant spillover effects outside Indian country. See, e.g., White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) (concluding that a state
may not tax non-Indian contractor's activities in Indian country without
showing a close nexus between the activities and legitimate off-reservation
state concerns); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980) (holding that a state may tax Indian
sales of cigarettes to non-Indians in Indian country because the product has
no reservation nexus and tribe is attempting to market a tax exemption to
non-Indians); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (explaining that a
state court has no jurisdiction to entertain a breach of contract action brought
by a non-Indian against an Indian where the cause of action arose in Indian
country). Accordingly, the conclusion in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191 (1989), that states may impose a severance tax upon a
non-Indian oil company operating wells in Indian country seems insupportable in the absence of clear congressional permission to do so. Cotton Petroleum may flip the former presumption in favor of state taxation. See Frickey,
supra note 14, at 422-23, 433-39 (explaining Cotton Petroleum's inconsistency
with Marshall's clear statement approach). But cf. Gila River Indian Community v. Waddell, 967 F.2d 1404, 1410-12 (9th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing Cotton Petroleum and applying a presumption against state taxation).
Untying this Gordian knot would be no simple matter. In the future,
however, the notion that the authority over Indian affairs is an inherent attribute of national sovereignty ought to encourage federal courts to engage in
strong presumptions against the exercise of state power in Indian country,
which would in turn encourage states to untangle themselves from relationships in Indian country or negotiate some mutually acceptable arrangement
with tribes.
163. The analogy would be similar to the approach taken under the
"dormant commerce clause," where, in the absence of congressional legislation, the default rule is that state legislation having a discriminatory or undue
burden on interstate commerce is invalid. Congress may, however, alter that
outcome by enacting legislation permitting the states to regulate. See, e.g.,
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 421-27 (1946) (upholding a
South Carolina tax regulating foreign insurance companies following congressional authorization of such regulation).
164. For good arguments that congressional power is limited by express
constitutional provisions such that Congress has no authority to regulate in-
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Congress may be supplemented by a quantum of inherent or
implied power, the question becomes whether the power to
make a particular intrusion upon internal tribal sovereignty
was implicit in-perhaps, because "necessary and proper" forthe colonial process.
Neither of these choices is entirely satisfactory. Although
limiting congressional power to the express grants in the Constitution is both normatively attractive and consistent with
overall principles of domestic constitutional interpretation under McCulloch, it is overwhelmingly inconsistent with past
practice, as ratified by the federal courts. The Marshall trilogy
itself assumed that certain nonconsensual intrusions upon internal tribal sovereignty were worked by the colonial process
even in the absence of any conquest.'6 5 For over a century
Congress has behaved as if it has inherent colonial power to intrude upon tribes, and the federal courts have never invalidated any such measures.
Today, there is probably no way to resolve this conflict definitively. Perhaps the best that we can do is hold these competing models of congressional power in tension and attempt to
moderate the harshness of the inherent power model while not
upsetting well-settled expectations that flow from past colonial
practices. Indeed, it is the attempt at judicial amelioration of
this tension in the Marshall trilogy that provides the most effective, practical model yet created for "doing" federal Indian
ternal tribal matters, see Clinton, supra note 67, at 991-1001, and Curtis G.
Berkey, United States-IndianRelations: The ConstitutionalBasis, in EXILED

IN THE LAND OF THE FREE 189 (Oren Lyons et al. eds, 1992). The argument
today could be bolstered by United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995),
which, in striking down a federal statute outlawing gun possession within
1,000 feet of a school, took seriously the notion that Congress's legislative
power must be tightly linked to constitutional text. My own sense is, however, that Lopez is not about the abstract limits of federal power under the
Constitution, but about protecting the state police power from congressional
intrusion. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (stating that upholding the statute
would transform the Commerce Clause into a general police power). Any attack upon congressional plenary power over Indian affairs would have to persuade the Court to prefer tribal, not state, legislative power to congressional
power. It strikes me as unrealistic to suggest that the Court will prefer tribal
power to congressional power. The greatest practical danger in federal Indian
law today is probably that the Court will also more aggressively prefer state
power to tribal power. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 14, at 422-24, 432-37
(analyzing the Rehnquist Court's decisions concerning state power in Indian

country).

165. See supra text accompanying notes 98-106 (discussing Marshall's understanding of the colonial process).
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law. 166

In any event, this dispute about the extent and nature of
congressional power is only half of the relevant constitutional
inquiry. If we assume that Congress has some inherent power
to deal with the issues in Indian affairs that may extend beyond the precise text of the Constitution, there remains an obvious constitutional theory for ameliorating abuses of that
power: the application of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the practical problem today is not whether the federal power over Indian
affairs is subject to some judicial limitations. It surely is. The
Court has explicitly rejected the notion that the congressional
power over Indian affairs is extra-constitutional. 16 7 Indeed, it
has afforded Indians constitutional protections in certain limited contexts.'6 8 Moreover, in federal Indian law there is a long
tradition, started in the Marshall trilogy, of subconstitutional
interpretive protection through the canons, which should dictate that Congress may only invade Indian rights through a
' The problem
clear statutory statement of its intent to do so. 69
is not, then, the complete absence of judicial review at the constitutional and subconstitutional levels. Instead, the dilemma
today is whether the Constitution and the canons have any
70
real vitality in protecting tribes against further colonization.1
Judicial review has been available in form, but not in substance.
The approach taken in the Marshall trilogy suggests that a
vitalization of the judicial role is appropriate. Marshall's leg-

166. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 427-29, 437-39.
167. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974).
168. The Court has long protected individual Indian property rights
against takings. See supra note 61 (citing cases in which the Court found governmental invasion of individual property rights). More recently, the Court
has expanded this protection to tribal lands. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 407-23 (1980) (providing a "just compensation" remedy for
the taking of lands held in "recognized" Indian title-i.e., title formally recognized by Congress by treaty or otherwise). In addition, the Court has indicated a willingness to consider broader challenges based on constitutional
limitations. See supra note 61 (suggesting the Court may employ a more aggressive rational basis test based on the unique aspects of congressionalIndian relations).
169. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 412-17 (detailing the quasiconstitutional clear statement rules employed by the Court in the Marshall

trilogy).
170. Cf Aleinikoff, supra note 68, at 866-67 (analyzing a similar dilemma
in immigration law).
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acy has two basic components. 17 1 One is based on comparative
institutional competence: courts should force Congress, rather
than other federal entities or the states, to do the unattractive
work of further colonization. The other is that Congress, in exercising its power in Indian affairs, should carefully consider
the Native side of the argument and make a reasoned judgment, rather than blindly imposing ethnocentric perspectives.
The current Supreme Court has largely lost sight of the
legacy left by Chief Justice Marshall. Although it will happily
admit that constitutional limits apply to congressional exercises of power in Indian affairs, it has not yet seen a statute invading Indian interests that it has judged constitutionally
troubling. Indeed, current constitutional trends suggest that
any vitalization of constitutional limitations in federal Indian
law might work to the detriment of tribes17 2 Of course, this
passivity toward Indian claims at the constitutional level does
not necessitate a similar nonchalance at the subconstitutional
interpretive level where the canons are applied. Indeed, a
proper understanding of Marshall's legacy is that the judicial
reluctance to invalidate congressional measures in federal Indian law should produce a correspondingly heightened judicial
energy in applying the canons to prevent inadvertent and
unthoughtful invasions of tribal rights.17 3 Unfortunately, however, the current Court has badly depreciated the canons, reducing them from clear statement requirements to be considered at the outset of the interpretive analysis to mere
tiebreakers that apply only if the court would otherwise flip a
coin.7 4 No such tie ever emerges in its analysis of these disputes because the current Court venerates state sovereignty
and has little respect for tribal independence. Consequently,
the canons have lost most of their influence. 7 5
17L See Frickey, supra note 14, at 427-37 (discussing each component in
light of recent Court precedent).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75 (describing the risk involved
with any diminution of Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs).
173. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 412-17 (discussing Marshall's use of
quasi-constitutional clear statement rules to protect the spirit of constitutive
documents such as Indian treaties).
174. See id. at 427-37 (describing this trend).
175. Indeed, in Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), the Court passed up
the invitation of the Solicitor General to hold that the Indian law canons be
formally recognized as requiring a clear congressional statement in statutory
text before Indian rights would be deemed to be invaded. See id. at 411-12.
Hagen itself is a good example of the weakness of the canons, as they are
applied today by the Court. The Court in that case concluded that an Indian
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What is needed is an understanding of federal Indian law
in which the judicial role of countering colonization is legitimated in substance as well as in form. In the next section, I
will propose such an approach, based on my reconstruction of
the constitutionality of federal power in the field. This approach would vitalize constitutional limitations, revitalize the
canons of interpretation, and more generally subject the field
to the rule of law.
II[. PLENARY POWER TOMORROW:
INTERNATIONALIZING THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT
The argument is a straightforward one. If the only legitimate constitutional justification for an expansive federal power
over Indian affairs lies in interpreting the Constitution against
the backdrop of international law, then international law is an
important framework for constitutional interpretation throughout the field of federal Indian law. In short, what is sauce for
the constitutional goose (legitimating the power by informing
the construction of Article I and other sources of congressional
authority) is sauce for the constitutional gander (limiting the
power by informing the interpretation of the Bill of Rights and
reservation had been diminished-its boundaries had shrunk, and with them
the tribe's geographical sovereignty-by a federal statute that imposed allotment on the reservation. See id. at 412-14. The statute provided for allotments for male tribal members and stated that "all the unallotted lands
within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain" and be available for non-Indian homesteading. See id. at 404 (quoting Act of May 27,
1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263 (1901-1903)). The Court concluded that this language about the "public domain" diminished the reservation boundaries such
that the unallotted lands were outside them. See id. at 412-22. A fairly obvious response is that opening up the reservation for non-Indian homesteading
is one thing, while reducing the territorial sovereignty of the tribe is quite another. The term "public domain" seems sufficiently ambiguous on the latter
question as to compel an interpretation through the canons that Congress did
not act clearly enough to effectuate a diminishment of the reservation. See id.
at 422-42 (Blackmun, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting). Also in great tension with a proper application of the canons is a decision a year earlier, South
Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), where the Court focused on the effects of statutory language rather than the intentions of Congress surrounding it. See id. at 691-92.
To the extent that the Indian law canons retain vitality, it tends to be in
some lower courts rather than in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Reich v. Great
Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Conm'n, 4 F.3d 490, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Posner, J.) (holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act does not apply to
tribal game warden police); Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F. Supp. 784, 835-36 (D. Minn. 1994) (determining that a tribe's usufructary rights were not extinguished by subsequent executive order or
treaty).
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by vitalizing subconstitutional judicial limits on congressional
power, such as the canons of interpretation). Congressional
power and the limits upon it should be viewed as two sides of a
coin, and if international law is relevant for the one, it should
be relevant for the other.
In addition to this formal symmetry, normative, functional
and practical considerations strongly support the argument for
the domestic relevance of international norms concerning indigenous peoples. As I have suggested, 17 6 federal Indian law
has long stood outside our traditions of limited national government and of the fundamental protection of important aspects of personal autonomy, including freedom from unconsented invasions of important interests, freedom of association, and ownership of property. Whatever might be said about
this sharp juxtaposition between our pre-constitutional pretensions and our post-constitutional conventions in the formative period in which Chief Justice Marshall struggled to accommodate constitutionalism and colonialism, it is simply indefensible today. Colonialism has now been unquestionably
repudiated; constitutionalism, as implemented by judicial review, is now essentially unquestioned. If we reinvigorate Marshall's mediating methodology, informed as it was by international law, within our current context, in which a less
deferential judicial role seems feasible, the emerging catalogue
of norms concerning the treatment of indigenous peoples provides a highly useful checklist of possibilities for consideration
in bringing federal Indian law into the mainstream of public
law. Because of the shared international experience of colonization, these norms, rather than being foreign jurisprudential
interlopers, may well resonate with our history, legal traditions, and current context. Indeed, in this Section I shall suggest that several of these norms have obvious practical relevance and appropriateness for domestic American law.
If accepted, this argument about the domestic constitutional relevance of international human rights norms concerning indigenous peoples goes a long way toward breaking the
deadlock over the application of such norms in American domestic courts. The international human rights movement has
been replete with efforts to identify and define the rights of

176. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12; note 71 (arguing that the
assumptions underlying limited government are incompatible with our tradition of colonizing the continent).
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on
indigenous peoples.177 Indeed, humanity recently embarked 178
the international decade of the world's indigenous peoples.
177. The United Nations Charter, adopted in 1945, urges member nations
to embrace a principle of self-determination of peoples. U.N. CHARTER art. 1,
para. 2; U.N. Charter art. 55. Beginning in the 1960s, the international community began pressuring for decolonization. The first efforts were focused
more on foreign colonies-that is, those dependent on another countryrather than on independent nations, such as the United States, that resulted
from colonization. See generally Curtis G. Berkey, InternationalLaw and
Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples, 5
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 75-80 (1992) (analyzing the application of the international right of self-determination to American Indian law). The United Nations declared the right of overseas colonies to self-determination in 1960. See
Declarationon the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960). Later efforts have addressed the problems encountered by indigenous persons found in independent nations. See Study of the Problem of
DiscriminationAgainst Indigenous Populations,U.N. Doc. E/CN.4Sub.2/1983
/21/Add. 4 (1987); Berkey, supra, at 80-87 (reviewing U.N. efforts to protect
the rights of indigenous people within independent nations).
In addition to any special protections related to their indigenous status,
native peoples may, of course, also claim the rights identified by international
law as available generally to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities. See,
e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976,
entered into force for the United States Sept. 8, 1992) ("In those states in
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.").
The literature on contemporary international human rights norms that
involve indigenous peoples is vast. See, e.g., ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
supra note 107; NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 129-77
(1982) (discussing the need for effective implementation of international
norms to secure the survival and flourishment of indigenous peoples); S.
James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in ContemporaryInternationalLaw,
ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L., Fall 1991, at 1-6 (reviewing significant advances
made by indigenous peoples in the area of international human rights law);
Russel L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International
Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 369, 369-85 (1986) (chronicling the development of indigenous rights and related international law); Hurst Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 649, 649-78 (1988) (tracing
the emergence of indigenous rights and analyzing the issues affecting the assertion of those rights today); Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerging InternationalNorm, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 127, 133-63
(1991) (arguing that the existing human rights norms adequately respond to
the problem confronting indigenous populations); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontierof InternationalHuman Rights Law: Redefining the
Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 67682 (discussing the emergence of indigenous human rights in contemporary international legal discourse).
178. See G.A. Res. 163, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 281, U.N.
Doec. A/48/49 (1993).
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Attempting to enforce these rights in American courts has been
fraught with difficulty, however. 179 A congressional action inconsistent with human rights recognized in an international
accord that the United States has ratified may simply be
deemed a unilateral abrogation of that international obligation, a congressional power recognized in the Chinese Exclusion
Case.' In addition, courts are likely to conclude that international accords are not self-executing, and thus the rights recognized in them have no domestic18 application without implementing legislation from Congress. 1
The problem of direct enforcement gets only worse, of
course, in the case of rights recognized in accords to which the
United States is not a party. In theory, once a norm achieves
sufficient international recognition it becomes part of customary international law, which is "part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction."" 2 Of course, even on these terms, international customary law may apply only where no domestic source
8 3 It is unsurprising,
of law determines the result."
however,
that federal courts have been loath to enforce these norms even
to that extent, fearing that they may misjudge the international norm and that, in any event, the incorporation of customary international law invades the prerogatives of the
American political branches to make law. 114
My theory does not ask American courts to enforce international human rights norms directly as a matter of domestic
law."8 5 Instead, at first glance it is similar to the theory, propounded by many scholars, that these norms should provide an
interpretive backdrop for our understanding of domestic law,
especially the potentially expansive constitutional clauses pro179. On the problems of enforcing these rights in international forums, see
W. Michael Reisman, ProtectingIndigenous Rights in InternationalAdjudication, 89 AM. J. INVL L. 350, 354-62 (1995).

180. See Berkey, supra note 177, at 88 (discussing the unilateral congressional power to abrogate treaty provisions).
18L

See id. at 89.

182. The Paquete Habara, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
183. See id. ("For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.")
184. See Berkey, supra note 177, at 88-91 (analyzing the direct enforcement of the right of self-determination).
185. Cf. ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 107, at 49-58 (arguing
that there is new customary international law governing the rights of indigenous peoples).
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tecting human rights.'86 The crucial difference is, however,
that my theory expressly links one area of international human
rights-that involving indigenous peoples--directly to the Constitution, rather than viewing it as merely a universal normative backdrop.187
The reason that this difference is important should be obvious. The federal courts will be reluctant to delegate the
meaning of our Constitution and other domestic law to the international community. Not only does this make the direct enforcement of international human rights unlikely, it also deters
judges from using those norms as a useful backdrop to their
understandings of even vague constitutional provisions. In186. See Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, InternationalHuman Rights
Law in United States Courts:A ComparativePerspective, 14 MICH. J. INTL L.
1, 23-27 (1992); Berkey, supra note 177, at 91-94; Richard B. Bilder, Integrating International Human Rights into Domestic Law-U.S. Experience, 4
Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-10 (1981); Lea Brilmayer, InternationalLaw in American Courts:A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2312-14 (1991); Gordon A.
Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation,4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 39, 39-57 (1981); Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal ProtectionAnalyses,
52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 12-13 (1983); Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and InternationalHuman Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 7678 (1990); Richard B. Lillich, Invoking InternationalHuman Rights Law in
Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 367, 408-12 (1985); Richard B. Lillich &
Hurst Hannum, Linkages Between International Human Rights and U.S.
ConstitutionalLaw, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 158, 159-63 (1985); Jordan J. Paust, On
Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the
Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543,
570-96 (1989); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and InternationalJudicial Protection of Individual Rights: A ComparativeLegal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 841-66 (1990). For a helpful overview,
see FRANK NEWMAN & DAvID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:

LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS, ch. 12 (2d ed. 1996).
187. In the general scholarly dialogue represented by sources in note 186,
supra,the "external" quality of international human rights norms is apparent.
As Gordon Christenson put it:
Human rights norms are a positive source of law external to the text
of the Bill of Rights or cases interpreting it. External sources such as
international law are not evidence of autonomous rules or authorities
that limit federal or state power under federal common law, although
such an argument has indeed been advanced. Rather, such external
sources form part of a universal context in which a right, because it is
juridically shaped from these sources, assumes importance in interpreting a limitation in the Bill of Rights, or in other constitutional
provisions designed to protect individual rights, in ways that avoid
unnecessary conflict with a state's obligations to the international
community.
Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, supra note 186, at 4-5.
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deed, the Supreme Court in the past decade has demonstrated
impatience with internationally informing our constitutional
law, holding that international standards concerning the execution of juveniles are not relevant to interpreting the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment."188
My theory is premised upon a much narrower understanding of the domestic role of international human rights.'8 9 Even
if the courts will not look to those rights to inform every question of domestic law involving human rights, such as free
speech or inhumane punishment, in federal Indian law cases
the courts are compelled to consider international law. The
reason is simple: the backdrop of international law provides
the only satisfactory basis for sorting out the existence of an
inherent federal power over Indian affairs. Accordingly, the
backdrop of international law should likewise be relevant in
considering limitations upon that power. The difference between my theory and the broader theory by which international norms may inform domestic law is that in my theory, international law has a direct-indeed, essential-linkage to the
area of domestic law in question.
Under this approach, international norms about the
treatment of indigenous persons would not be directly enforceable in American courts, but instead would provide a relevant
and worthwhile backdrop against which to consider constitutional and quasi-constitutional claims. Thus, an international
norm that does not link up with a constitutional provision limiting governmental power would presumably have less persuasive force than one that is closely connected to a constitu188. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989); cf. Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,830-31 & n.34 (1988) (plurality opinion of Stevens,
J.) (containing an Eighth Amendment analysis informed by international
norms); id. at 868-69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (countering that international
norms are irrelevant to Eighth Amendment interpretation). The Court also
refused to interpret the United States-Mexico extradition treaty to forbid
American agents from kidnapping a Mexican citizen in Mexico in order to
prosecute him in the United States for his alleged involvement in the murder
of an American agent in Mexico. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504
U.S. 655, 663-65 (1992). To reach this conclusion, the Court had to interpret
the treaty woodenly and avoid customary international law. See id. at 667-68.
Indeed, the Court admitted that its interpretation "may be in violation of general international law principles." Id. at 669.
189. I do not mean to denigrate legal arguments urging a broader acceptance of international human rights in domestic American law. My point is
that one need go only so far in order to embrace the proposition that those
norms concerning indigenous peoples are highly relevant to the interpretation
of the Constitution.
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tional limitation. 9 ° Moreover, even those norms closely connected to constitutional limitations would not compel a constitutional interpretation equivalent to the international norm.
Instead, the international norm should be treated as roughly
equivalent to domestic norms that inform constitutional adjudication.
The theory that the power over Indian affairs in the
United States must necessarily be interpreted against its international backdrop has many potential consequences for both
the constitutional basis of and the limitations upon this power.
For purposes of illustration, I begin with two examples that
demonstrate how the constitutional aspects of federal Indian
law would profit from an examination of the international perspective. I then conclude by considering how the internationalization of the domestic context should influence subconstitutional public law, such as the interpretation of treaties
and statutes.
A. TAKINGS
No grant of authority to Congress in Article I squarely encompasses the power of eminent domain. Nonetheless, much
like the power over immigration and, I have argued, the power
over Indian affairs, the Supreme Court has concluded that
Congress has eminent domain power because it is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, 9 ' an "offspring of political necessity."'92 It has been long settled' 93 that Congress may exercise
the power of eminent domain as long as it satisfies the Fifth
Amendment's requirements that the taking of private property
be for "public use" and that the owner receive "just compensa-

190. For example, our entire constitutional tradition is based on the notion
of negative rights against governmental action, not positive rights to governmental protection or benefits. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept.
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-97 (1989) (holding that the Due Process
Clause does not impose a positive duty to provide adequate protective services
to members of the general public). International human rights norms involving indigenous peoples that amount to positive, rather than negative, rights
will prove to be much harder to integrate with our Constitution. See, e.g., ILO
Convention 169, Jun. 7, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382, 1389-91 (creating positive rights
to health care and education).
191. See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681
(1896).
192. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897).
193. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1875).
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tion." 194 Under the current precedent, these two limitations
provide no practical way to prevent the exercise of this congressional power. As long as Congress is willing to pay "just
compensation"-defined as fair market value at the time of the
taking' 9 5 -the "public use" requirement will not prevent any
taking. Although it remains true that a taking for a private
use would be unconstitutional, the Court has essentially
treated the public-purpose requirement as a legislative, not
judicial, question. The requirement that the taking be for a
public use is no more stringent a constraint than other limitations upon "a sovereign's police powers." 196 This approach essentially conflates the judicial review of the question whether
the taking is for a public purpose with the question whether
the action violates substantive due process or equal protection.
For such governmental economic regulation, this standard, and
therefore derivatively the takings public-use test, is the weakest form of rational-basis review: whether the governmental
act
197
is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."
The relationship between the public-purpose requirement
and the just-compensation requirement has been a fascinating
one. 19 In a nutshell, because of the demise of Lochner and serious judicial second-guessing of economic legislation, the
courts abandoned intrusive review of whether a taking was in
the public interest. Instead, it is assumed that the requirement of just compensation sufficiently ensures that Congress
or the state legislatures believe that a taking of property serves
the common good. By making the government pay for expropriations, the theory is that there will be sufficient checks upon
abuse, and that any remaining abuses are not susceptible to
easy judicial identification and remediation.
This approach is nothing short of disastrous when applied
to the taking of Indian lands.'99 The payment of money-even
194. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
195. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
196. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,240 (1984).
197. Id. at 241. For a recent and highly deferential version of the rational
basis test for economic regulation, see Federal Communications Corm'n v.
Beech Communications,Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-18 (1993).
198. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW 588-92 (2d
ed. 1988).
199. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision
Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 153-58
(1993); Clinton, supra note 67, at 1042-44. Of course, this approach at least

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:31

fair market value-does not begin to compensate when the
taking involves aboriginal lands, with their extraordinary cultural significance. It is compensation, to be sure, but it is not
"just"recompense. There is usually no way to take the money
and buy equivalent land elsewhere. Ordinarily, no equivalent
land exists, and even if it does, the current owner may not wish
to sell. In the context of Indian lands, using the justcompensation requirement as a legislative process surrogate
for substantive review of whether the taking is in the public interest imposes the western, capitalist assumption that land
and capital are fungible upon a nonwestern, noncapitalist culture in which they are not. It is, in short, a form of judicial
colonization.
The long saga of the taking of the Black Hills confirms this
conclusion about the nonequivalence of land and money. After
a legal battle that stretched over half a century, in 1980 the
Supreme Court concluded that the United States had taken the
Black Hills from the Sioux Nation and that just compensation,
including interest, was required."' When the federal money
was set aside in the federal treasury for the Sioux Nation,
however, the tribes that constitute that Nation refused to accept it.20 The tribes argued that money was not an appropriate substitutionary remedy for the loss of lands of such cultural
and religious significance, and that taking the money would
dissipate the tribes' moral claims to an entitlement to the return of the lands. °2 The money still sits in the federal treasury, earning interest, as the
tribes hope for federal legislation
20 3
returning some of the land.
provides some monetary compensation. Even worse is the rule that Congress
may take Indian land without any requirement of compensation as long as the
land is held in aboriginal title rather than recognized title (i.e., title formally
recognized by Congress by treaty or otherwise). See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (describing the Court's adoption of this rule).
200. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980). For an
overview of the history of this dispute, see Nell J. Newton, Indian Claims in
the Courts of the Conqueror,41 AM. U. L. REV. 753, 763-65 (1992).
201. See EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS: WHITE JUSTICE 353 (1991).
202. See id. at 353-54.
203. Because interest accrues to this account, the amount set aside for the
tribes continues to grow. Newton, supra note 200, at 765 n.62 (noting that in
1992, the accumulated amount was more than $315 million).
During the 1980s, Senator Bradley introduced legislation that would have
returned some of the Black Hills to the tribes. See S. 705, 100th Cong. (1987).
No member of the South Dakota delegation in Congress ever co-sponsored the
bill. See Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place:A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L. REv. 246, 264 n.99 (1989).
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Of course, when the federal government confiscated the
Black Hills in the 1870s, it probably did not imagine that just
compensation was even required. °4 Even in more modern circumstances, however, in which Congress is on notice that fair
market value must be paid for Indian lands, the requirement of
payment has not produced any assurance that the sensitive issues involving the loss of aboriginal lands are carefully considered. For example, the availability of fair-market-value compensation for the takings of Indian lands did not prevent the
expropriation in the mid-twentieth century of huge portions of
Indian land in North and South Dakota for water projects
along the Missouri River." 5 The federal government undertook
this project without consulting with, much less with the consent of, the tribes, and it had draconian cultural and economic
effects. 20 6 The requirement of fair-market-value payment was
a wholly inadequate deterrent to this baldly colonial act, and
the payment of it was hardly 'just" compensation.
When the Takings Clause is read against the backdrop of
international law in general and international human rights
norms in particular, the ill fit between the context of federal
Indian law and the usual understandings of "public purpose"
and "just compensation" becomes even more apparent.0 7
Documents seeking to identify the contemporary international
human rights norms concerning indigenous people uniformly
stress the value of aboriginal lands. For example, Convention

204. The tribes lost the Black Hills as part of an 1877 "agreement." Act of
Feb. 28, 1877, ch. 72, 19 Stat. 254, 255 (1875-1877). Congress forced the Act
upon them, and in return the Indians received some rations. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 383 n.14. At that time-the beginning of the "plenary power"
era-Congress might well have assumed courts would not second-guess the
legitimacy of this transaction, much less conclude it constituted a Fifth
Amendment taking.
205. See Pommersheim, supra note 203, at 260-61, upon which this discussion is based.
206. The federal government took over 550 square miles of Indian land and
displaced over 900 Indian families, resulting in the dismantling of Indian
communities and the disruption of their economy. Id. at 261. The flooding of
ancestral land had devastating religious and psychological consequences as
well. Id. Vine Deloria, the eminent scholar of federal Indian policy, called
this "the single most destructive act ever perpetrated on any tribe by the
United States." Id. (quoting MICHAEL L. LAWSON, DAMNED INDIANS: THE
PICK-SLOAN PLAN AND THE MISSOURI RIVER SIOUX, at xiv (1982)).
207. See Michael L. Ferch, Indian Land Rights:An InternationalApproach
to Just Compensation, 2 TRANSNATIL L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 302-05
(1992); Lawrence B. Landman, InternationalProtectionfor American Indian
Land Rights?, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 59, 75-84 (1987).
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169 of the International Labour Organisation, the Convention
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, contains an entire Part concerning aboriginal
lands." 8 It calls upon governments to "respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the people concerning their relationship with the lands ... which they occupy
or otherwise use"20 9 and, except in exceptional situations, to
avoid removing indigenous persons from these lands without
their consent.210 If indigenous lands are taken, the preferred
remedy is the provision of "lands of quality and legal status at
least equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them,
suitable to provide for their present needs and future development."211 Money constitutes adequate212compensation only when
the peoples involved prefer it to land.
The United States has not ratified this Convention, and as
yet it has not garnered substantial agreement from other nations.21 3 As such, it is unlikely to be directly enforceable in
American law.214 Nonetheless, as a contemporary expression of
emerging international law norms applicable to colonized peoples, it provides an interesting, useful-and, I have argued,
necessarily relevant 2 5 -backdrop against which critically to
assess constitutional takings doctrine. Because the American
experience with the taking of Native lands confirms the normative attractiveness as well as the practical importance of the
208. ILO Convention 169, supra note 190, pt. II, at 1387. For a useful and
succinct overview of International Labour Organisation Convention 169 and
related international developments, see ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra
note 107, at 43-58. For his discussion of Part IIon land, see id. at 104-07.
209. Indigenous Peoples Convention, supra note 190, art. 13, at 1387.
210. Id. art. 16, at 1387-88.
211. Id. at 1388.
212. Id. Much the same approach to the land rights of indigenous peoples
is taken by the Members of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. U.N.
Draft Declarationon Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Economic and Social Council,
11th Sess., arts. 7(b), 10, 25-27, 30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1993/29 (1993).
This draft "recogniz[es] the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent
rights and characteristics of indigenous peoples, especially their rights to
their lands, territories and resources, which derive from their political, economic and social structures, and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies." Id. at Annex I.
213. See Barsh, supra note 177, at 43-46.
214. But cf. ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 107, at 49-58
(arguing for enforcement as customary international law).
215. See supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text (describing the constitutional relevance of international law norms concerning indigenous peoples).
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principles identified in the Convention, a reconsideration of
American takings doctrine within the context of Native lands is
in order.
This reevaluation is hardly a revolutionary idea. Indeed,
the Marshall Court itself recognized that Indian lands are not
identical in law to other lands. Under the colonizing process
conceptualized in Worcester, which remains the most important
case in federal Indian law, the colonizing sovereign did not
possess a unilateral power of displacement, even if compensation was provided. Rather, it possessed only "the exclusive
purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to
right2 of
16
sell."
A more normatively attractive approach to the taking of
Indian lands, consistent both with the longstanding assumptions of the Marshall Court and with emerging international
norms, would recognize a presumption against the taking of
Indian lands without consent and a preference for recompense
in the form of land rather than money. This accommodation
could be achieved rather easily under current constitutional
law.
The place to begin is with the construction of a theory that
ordinarily prevents the unilateral taking of Indian land. The
obvious doctrinal modification would be to heighten the scrutiny applied to whether the taking of Indian land is "for public
use." In addressing this inquiry, courts should ask whether
the taking serves a public value rather than merely a private
interest (for example, in using governmental power to effectu2 17
ate a naked transfer from one private entity to another).
Ordinarily, the payment of fair market value, assumedly an
adequate substitutionary remedy for the loss of property, and a
facially plausible justification for the taking being in the general public interest should suffice. But Indian lands are not
ordinary lands: they are not sufficiently fungible to make the
payment of fair market value an acceptable equivalent to the
land, and the fear of a governmental taking rooted in prejudice
or selective cultural indifference is substantially greater for

216. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 545 (1832). Although in the first
major federal Indian law case Marshall stated that under the colonial process
Indian lands could be obtained "either by purchase or by conquest," Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587 (1823), his later and far more important decision
in Worcester omitted any reference to conquest. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 545.
217. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1723-27 (1984).
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Indian lands than for the lands of others. At a minimum, then,
no taking of Indian land should be allowed without a strong
justification in public values that outweighs the hardship to
the Indians and that cannot be well served by other means.218
In particular, courts should inquire whether the federal government carefully considered alternatives to the taking of Indian land. Administrative convenience and saving federal
money should not be boilerplate defenses to objections to the
taking of Indian lands. Alternatives such as taking privately
held land and encountering greater inconvenience and cost
should not only be considered, they should be balanced against
the hardship occasioned to the Indians by the proposed taking.
Second, in those instances in which the federal government makes the requisite showing and would be allowed to
take Indian lands, the 'Just compensation" required should
presumably be land as equivalent as possible to the taken land,
not money. The burden ought to be on the government, pre218. What I have in mind here is a rigorous rationality scrutiny akin to the
intermediate scrutiny applied to a gender classification, which can be sustained only if it "serve[s] important governmental objectives and [is] substan-

tially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). Gender classifications are presumptively unconstitutional,
and the burden is on the government to demonstrate the constitutionality of
such a classification. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982). Thus, before adopting a gender classification, the legislature must
"choose either to realign their substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or
to adopt procedures for identifying those instances where the sex-centered
generalization actually comported with fact." Craig, 429 U.S. at 199.
Intermediate scrutiny of this kind would be a reasonable way to implement the constitutional rationality inquiry in federal Indian law. At the moment, in form the constitutional standard is whether the policy "can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). Note that this is a special
kind of rational basis inquiry, for it seemingly precludes the constitutionality
of measures that harm Indians. Perhaps for this reason, in later cases where
classifications disadvantaging Indians were at issue, the Court seemingly reverted to garden-variety rational basis review, under which essentially any
measure is constitutional. See supra note 61 and accompanying text
(describing the dearth of Court decisions finding constitutional infirmity with
congressional action involving Indians). However, at least where Indian
claims match up well with international law norms, such as in the case of the
taking of land, much more rigorous constitutional review should be required.
If courts did not wish formally to abandon rational basis review, many of
these same objectives could be achieved by bringing into federal Indian law
the "rationality with bite" approach taken in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448-50 (1985), where the Court required that the regulation
reasonably serve a legitimate public purpose, and Evans v. Romer, 116 S. Ct.
1620 (1996), where the Court struck down an anti-gay initiative because it
lacked a legitimate public purpose.
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sumably with the cooperation of the tribe, to identify equivalent land, take title to that land by eminent domain, and then
transfer title to that land to the tribe in compensation for the
Indian land taken. The tribe has no private right of eminent
domain: it cannot compel the owners of land of particular importance to the tribe to sell, whether for fair market value or
any other price. The government has that power and should
use it in a way that results in a best approximation of truly
"just compensation" for the tribe. Only if the tribe prefers
money should the presumption in favor of land for land be
overcome. When there simply is no available land even
roughly equivalent in significance to the Indian land proposed
to be taken, that strongly counsels for even higher scrutiny of
whether the taking is justified in the first place. The point, after all, is that compensation should be "just," and conclusions
about justice in the area of the taking of Indian land are quite
different from those usually encountered in the taking of other
land for governmental purposes. These considerations are not
simply matters of morality or natural law: they are made constitutionally cognizable through the backdrop of international
law, as it should inform both the federal power over Indian affairs and the limitations upon that power.
B. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
219
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
Indians were big losers in a decision narrowly interpreting the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In Lyng, the
Court rejected a claim that the Free Exercise Clause was violated by the federal construction of a road across the federal
public domain that would allegedly drastically interfere withindeed, perhaps destroy-the religious practices of Indians.
The backdrop of international human rights norms, as they inform limitations upon federal and state power, confirms the incorrectness of this decision.
Lyng involved sacred religious sites on land that is now
within the federal National Forest System but to which Indians had access for their religious practices. The plaintiffs objected to a United States Forest Service proposal to build a
paved road and allow timbering near these sites. The Forest
Service's own study of the issue concluded that the area "is
significant as an integral and indispensible [sic] part of Indian
219. 485 U.s. 439 (1988).
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religious conceptualization and practice" and that constructing
the road "would cause serious and irreparable damage to the
sacred areas which are an integral and necessary part of the
belief systems and lifeway" of the Indians.22 ° Although the
Forest Service modified the proposal somewhat in an effort to
lessen the interference with Indian religion, the district court
concluded that even as revised both the road building and the
timbering "would seriously damage the salient visual, aural,
and environmental qualities of the high country" and accordingly found a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 22' The
Ninth Circuit agreed.222
In rejecting this conclusion, the Supreme Court assumed
"that the Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere and that the
Government's proposed actions will have severe adverse effects
on the practice of their religion,"223 indeed perhaps "'virtually
destroy[ing] the . . . Indians' ability to practice their religion."'2 4 Nonetheless, in the view of the Court, no free exercise
violation had occurred for two reasons. First, the First
Amendment does not require the government to conduct its internal affairs, including the management of federal lands, in
ways that comport with particular religious beliefs.2 25 Second,
the challenged governmental action did not prohibit, punish, or
coerce any particular religious practice.226 Because the Supreme Court could find no burden on the free exercise of religion, it never balanced the importance of the governmental project against the harm caused to religion. 227 When stripped of its
220. Id. at 442.
221. Id. at 443-44 (quoting Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v.
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 594-95 (N.D. Cal. 1983)).
222. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795
F.2d 688, 698 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). The opinion was written by Judge Canby, a

respected scholar of federal Indian law.

For examples of his work, see

WILLIAM CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1988); William

Canby, The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L.
REv. 1 (1987).
223. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447.
224. Id. at 451-52 (quoting Ninth Circuit opinion below).
225. See id. at 447-49 (relying upon Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)).
226. See id. at 449.
227. In earlier cases in which a burden on a religious practice was acknowledged, the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny by asking whether
the interference with the free practice of religion was justified by a compelling
government interest that could not be served by less intrusive means. See,
e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (determining that no compelling
state interest existed in requiring a member of Seventh-Day Adventist
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First Amendment veneer, however, the Court's view of the case
boiled down to an assessment of competing property interests.
The Court described the Indians' claim as one to a "religious
servitude"2 28 on public land, surmised that this claim could ultimately result in "de facto beneficial ownership of some rather
spacious tracts of public property," 9 and concluded that
"[w]hatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area,
... those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use
what is, after all, its land."23 '
The basic problem with the analysis in Lyng is that it
takes an extraordinarily ethnocentric approach to freedom of
religion. 231 The assumption in Lyng is that religion is transcendental: belief consists of a faith in a God out in the ether
somewhere, and religious practice is simply activity connected
to that kind of belief. What happens on earth cannot destroy
religious beliefs. Thus, for example, if a state highway department by eminent domain takes a Lutheran church building for a road project, the congregation simply accepts fair
market value as the measure of just compensation and goes
elsewhere to buy or build a new church, with their religious
beliefs fully intact. As Lyng acknowledged, however, American
Indian religions are often not transcendental: the gods are
found on the earth, and the practice of the religion is inextriChurch to work on the Saturday sabbath day or risk losing unemployment
compensation benefits).
228. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452.
229. Id. at 453.
230. Id.
231. Another problem is the Court's failure to consider that the federal
government had not owned this land from time immemorial. The question
begged by this analysis is how this land came to be federal land. In another
sensitive area of property rights in the arid western United States-water
rights-the Supreme Court has long held that tribes may have off-reservation
reserved water rights that amount to a servitude providing access across private and public land and guaranteeing enough water to make the reservation
a viable enterprise. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77
(1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905). The theory of the
reserved water rights cases is that the tribe would not cede lands adjoining
water to the federal government and be left with a reservation lacking access
to water without implicitly reserving to the tribe enough water to make the
remaining reservation functional. Contrary to the suggestion in Lyng, then,
tribes do sometimes have "servitudes" across lands that they lost through
some earlier dealings with the federal government. To be sure, there may be
important distinctions between off-reservation water rights and rights of religious access. Nonetheless, at a minimum the water-rights cases severely
undercut the Court's instinctive reaction that off-reservation servitudes are
highly implausible.
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cably linked to where those gods are and what believers must
do at those locations. Thus, as lower court cases before Lyng
graphically demonstrated, taking Indian sacred lands by eminent domain for a water project that results in the flooding of
those lands causes harm to religion well beyond the nuisance
factor experienced by the Lutheran congregation hypothesized
above. The flooding drowns the gods present on those lands
and effectively destroys the religious beliefs of these people.23 2
Application of such Euro-American assumptions about
what free exercise of religion should mean is simply another
example of the unilateral displacement of Native interests and
the ongoing colonization of this continent. International human rights norms confirm this conclusion. For example, ILO
Convention 169 endorses the protection of "the social, cultural,
religious and spiritual values and practices" 2 33 of Natives. In
addition, as noted before, 23 4 the Convention recognizes "the
special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the
peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands . . .
which they occupy or otherwise use,"235 as well as to "lands not
exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities. 236
232. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F.2d 1159, 1160 (6th Cir. 1980). See gen-

erally Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Government De-

velopment of PublicLands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447 (1985) (describing challenges by
Indian tribes that development plans affecting sacred areas in previously undisturbed federal and state lands are violations of the Free Exercise Clause).
233. ILO Convention 169, supra note 190, at 1385.

234. See supra text accompanying notes 208-212 (discussing the Convention's recommendation that governments respect the special importance of the
cultures and spiritual values of indigenous people).
235. ILO Convention 169, supra note 190, at 1387.
236. Id. Similar norms are presented in the U.N. Draft Declarationof the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 212, arts. 7(a), 8, 12-14, 25. In particular, it provides that indigenous peoples have "the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites." Id. art.
13. In this respect, Lyng, in involving religious sites, is distinguishable from
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), in which the claim was that the federal
assignment and internal governmental use of a social security number invaded Native American religious freedom.
In addition, in this context Native Americans could also contend that
their right to free exercise of religion is informed by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Unlike ILO Convention 169,
supra note 190, the International Covenant has been ratified by the United
States. See supra text accompanying note 213 (noting that the United States
has not ratified the Convention). The support of the International Covenant
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These international human rights norms squarely support
the criticism that Lyng defined a "burden" on the free exercise
of religion too narrowly.2317 Even if some minority religions lack
protection against their destruction through governmental actions antagonistic to their belief structures, Native American
religions stand on a different footing. At a minimum, the judicial role in ameliorating ongoing colonization should have led
the Court to balance the relevant interests in the case, rather
than abjure from any balancing test through the threshold requirement of a too-narrowly-defined "burden." That balance
would have almost surely favored the Native claim: the governmental interest in promoting direct routing of traffic and
timbering of federal trees seems quite
insignificant measured
38
against the destruction of a religion.
would therefore add particular weight to this claim.
237. See Ira Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the

FreeExercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989) (critiquing the current
judicial requirement to show burden on religious activity to establish a violation of the Free Exercise Clause). For a related but broader critique of Lyng
challenging the Courtes refusal to approach the context of that case critically,
see Joseph William Singer, Propertyand Coercionin FederalIndianLaw: The
Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.

1821 (1990).
238. Of course, because international human rights norms under my theory are not directly translatable into constitutional rights, but rather provide
a relevant backdrop for them in the Native American context, there may well
be cases in which federal action of great significance would outweigh Native
religious claims. My point is that Lyng becomes an easy case once judicial
balancing is required.
In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court rejected
the argument that a state violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying unemployment compensation to a Native American who had been fired as a drug
counselor at a private firm because he had taken sacramental peyote during a
religious service of the Native American Church. A consideration of international human rights norms would provide a considerably greater sensitivity
about any governmental action penalizing the use of a Native religious sacrament. This conclusion seems inescapable in Smith, where there was no
showing that the use of sacramental peyote had ever caused any lawenforcement problems or other public policy concerns. See id. at 911-13
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Again, the backdrop of international norms, as
influencing constitutional interpretation, should produce a balancing test in
which the government is put to the challenge of defending its regulatory interest as serving an important government interest through narrowly tailored
means that transcends the hardship to Native American religious practitioners.
Congress has overturned the result in Smith by statute. See Pub. L. No.
103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994) and preempting state laws penalizing the use of sacramental peyote). In light of the
federalization of Indian affairs, see supra note 162, there should be no constitutional federalism objection to this statute.
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C. QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETiVE TECHNIQUES

As long ago as 1804, the Supreme Court announced that
"an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
39
law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
Essentially throughout its entire history, then, the Supreme
Court has embraced a canon of interpretation that promotes an
interpretation of domestic statutes consistent with international law.24 When, in relatively short order, the Court confronted the question of interpreting Indian treaties, it adopted
similar canons designed to preserve the pre-existing inherent
tribal rights241under international law from all but clear textual
abrogation.
The current Supreme Court has largely lost this profoundly important legacy of the Marshall Court.242 Yet if, as I
have argued, constitutional interpretation should be informed
by international norms, statutory interpretation should be
even more amenable to that kind of principled supplementation. Indeed, it is a time-honored tradition, with many contemporary examples, that constitutional values that are difficult to enforce through direct judicial review become reflected
in canons of interpretation that attempt to mold statutory
Congress also attempted to promote minority religious freedom in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.

1488, (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)). Unfortunately, the
trigger for these enhanced statutory protections of the exercise of religion is a
showing of a substantial burden on religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)
(1994). By retaining this threshold test, the statute probably does not overturn the result in Lyng. Recently, President Clinton issued an executive order
directing federal agencies to take practicable steps to accommodate access to
and use of Indian sacred sites. See Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg.
26,771 (1996).
239. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804).
240. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw As a Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990) (analyzing the

principles behind the juridical relationship between international law and
domestic law).
241. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 398-417; text accompanying notes 104106 (suggesting that Marshall created canons recognizing inherent tribal sovereignty for interpreting Indian treaties). The parallelism to immigration law

continues to hold here as well. See Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Inter-

pretation, supra note 68, at 567-75 (positing that federal courts have used
"phantom norms" embodied in canons of interpretation to ameliorate some of
the harshness of the plenary-power doctrine in immigration law).
242. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 418-26, 432-37; supra text accompanying notes 171-175 (elaborating upon this conclusion).
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meaning consistent with those values.243 The advantage of the
canonical method over judicial statutory invalidation under
Marbury v. Madison2' is that the former is often less countermajoritarian and may engage Congress in a dialogue about
public values.
Federal Indian law issues, like issues concerning separation of powers and federalism, often involve the question
whether Congress has gone too far in invading the prerogatives
of another sovereign entity (the executive branch, the states,
the tribes). The Court currently uses canons to buffer congressional excesses in these other constitutionally sensitive
structural areas, 245 and the same strategy is evident in Chief
Justice Marshall's creation and application of the Indian law
canons.24 6 Because he molded these canons against the backdrop of international law,247 they should be nurtured by international norms as well as domestic values.
A brief return to the constitutional values involved in the
taking of Indian land248 and in the interference with the free
exercise of Native religious freedom 24 9 illustrates the power of
the canonical approach to federal Indian law, as informed by
international human rights norms. As a threshold requirement before addressing whether the government can defend
the taking of Indian lands against a constitutional challenge,
for example, a court should require a clear statement in statutory text acknowledging that the land is held by Indians and
expressly intending to take the land for an articulated national
purpose.2 ° Similarly, courts should expansively construe stat243. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: ClearStatement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 593 (1992).
244. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
245. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 243, at 609-11.
246. See Frickey, supra note 14, at 412-17 (suggesting Marshall created
canons to protect documents from interpretations that would violate their un.derlying nature and purposes).
247. See Angela R. Hoeft, Note, Coming Full Circle: American Indian
Treaty Litigationfrom an InternationalHuman Rights Perspective, 14 LAw &
INEQ. J. 203, 212 (1995); supra text accompanying notes 98-107 (indicating
that Marshall incorporated international law into the domestic law of Indian
affairs).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 191-218 (discussing the Takings
Clause and the power of eminent domain in the context federal Indian law).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 219-238 (discussing the Free Exercise Clause and Native American religion).
250. Cf. United States v. Winnebago Tribe, 542 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1976)
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utes to protect Native American religious liberty25 1 and require
a clear showing of legislative intent before assuming that Congress wished to invade Indian religious rights. Indeed, had the
Supreme Court taken this approach in Lyng, the constitutional
issue might have disappeared.25 2
CONCLUSION
Louis Henkin, the eminent international law scholar, once
wrote that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all
of the time."253 Whatever might be said about the accuracy of
this generalization in international law, it has little relationship to the reality of federal Indian law. Federal Indian law
has been impoverished of principles, and the treaty obligations
found in it have been routinely violated from the colonial period onward. The congressional irresponsibility and the judicial abdication might be summed up in three not-so-little
words: "congressional plenary power."
Over five centuries after the Columbian encounter and
over two centuries after the constitutional incarnation, the co-

(recognizing that congressional intent to take particular Indian lands was not
sufficiently clear to authorize the Army Corps of Engineers to acquire the land
by eminent domain). The approach would be similar to that taken for congressional abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity or for
congressional invasion of a core state function through the authority to regulate interstate commerce: whether Congress has made its intention to do so
"'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.'" Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (discussing Tenth Amendment standard while quoting
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
251. See supra note 238 (discussing two statutes and an executive order
dealing with Native American religious liberty).
252. In Lyng, the Court held that the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(1994)), created no judicially enforceable rights. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455.
In Smith, the Oregon Supreme Court missed a similar opportunity. The
first time that case made its way to the Supreme Court, the Court reversed
and remanded for a determination whether sacramental use of peyote violated
state law. See Smith, 485 U.S. at 660. Had the Oregon Supreme Court approached the issue in a canonical manner, it might well have found an implied
exception to the state criminal laws for sacramental use of peyote and thereby
avoided the constitutional issue. Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490,
500-01 (1979) (holding that courts should avoid addressing a constitutional issue unless "the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed" requires the court to do so); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892) (reading a federal criminal statute creatively and narrowly to avoid interference with free exercise of religion).
253. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 42 (1968).
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lonial process continues. For a century, it has been viewed as a
matter both solely domestic and almost completely nonjudicial.
An appreciation for the backdrop of international law destroys
both of these easy assumptions and provides the missing link
between colonialism and constitutionalism.
"But," one might respond, "power, war, conquest, give
rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world; and
which can never be controverted by those on whom they descend."254 So said Chief Justice Marshall, in declining to
evaluate the normative questions surrounding the original
colonization of this continent. Need we, a century and one-half
later, in a world considerably less sanguine about colonization,
settle for this little? Marshall himself had at least a partial
answer: "We proceed, then, to the actual state of things, having
glanced at their origin, because holding it in our recollection
might shed some light on existing pretensions." 255 Congressional plenary power is an existing pretension. As Marshall
himself understood, it was only by reference to its "origin" in
international law that congressional power over Indian affairs
could become part of our domestic law. "Holding" historical
and contemporary international law "in our recollection" does
"shed light" on congressional plenary power in much the same
way as sunshine disinfects. It is time to domesticate this most
undelimited of domestic powers by internationalizing our understanding of it.

254. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832).
255. Id.

